



1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:09,589

[Music]

2
00:00:14,250 --> 00:00:12,549

this is somewhere in the skies with ryan

3
00:00:35,270 --> 00:00:14,260

spread

4
00:00:39,030 --> 00:00:37,110

the subcommittee will come to order

5
00:00:40,709 --> 00:00:39,040

without objection the chair may declare

6
00:00:41,990 --> 00:00:40,719

recess at any time

7
00:00:43,830 --> 00:00:42,000

before we get started i want to

8
00:00:45,910 --> 00:00:43,840

recognize a moment of silence for the

9
00:00:47,830 --> 00:00:45,920

victims of the white supremacist hate

10
00:00:49,910 --> 00:00:47,840

crime in buffalo new york the

11
00:00:52,069 --> 00:00:49,920

subcommittee has focused intently on

12
00:00:54,549 --> 00:00:52,079

that threat in both open and closed

13
00:00:56,830 --> 00:00:54,559

hearings it is utterly devastating to

14

00:01:06,870 --> 00:00:56,840

see more victims of this violence

15

00:01:10,390 --> 00:01:09,429

with that i ask my colleagues to join

16

00:01:12,390 --> 00:01:10,400

pardon me

17

00:01:16,070 --> 00:01:12,400

we will now turn to the business of this

18

00:01:20,870 --> 00:01:18,070

more than 50 years ago

19

00:01:21,830 --> 00:01:20,880

the u.s government ended project blue

20

00:01:24,469 --> 00:01:21,840

book

21

00:01:26,870 --> 00:01:24,479

an effort to catalog and understand

22

00:01:29,590 --> 00:01:26,880

sightings of objects in the air

23

00:01:31,670 --> 00:01:29,600

that could not otherwise be explained

24

00:01:34,069 --> 00:01:31,680

for more than 20 years that project had

25

00:01:36,789 --> 00:01:34,079

treated unidentified anomalies in our

26

00:01:38,830 --> 00:01:36,799

airspace as a national security threat

27

00:01:41,510 --> 00:01:38,840

to be monitored and

28

00:01:42,710 --> 00:01:41,520

investigated in 2017 we learned for the

29

00:01:45,429 --> 00:01:42,720

first time that the department of

30

00:01:47,749 --> 00:01:45,439

defense had quietly restarted a similar

31

00:01:50,149 --> 00:01:47,759

organization tracking what we now call

32

00:01:51,030 --> 00:01:50,159

unidentified aerial phenomena

33

00:01:52,630 --> 00:01:51,040

or

34

00:01:55,109 --> 00:01:52,640

uaps

35

00:01:57,350 --> 00:01:55,119

last year congress rewrote the charter

36

00:01:59,350 --> 00:01:57,360

for that organization now called the

37

00:02:01,429 --> 00:01:59,360

airborne object identification and

38

00:02:02,469 --> 00:02:01,439

management synchronization group

39

00:02:04,789 --> 00:02:02,479

or

40

00:02:06,789 --> 00:02:04,799

aim sog

41

00:02:09,190 --> 00:02:06,799

for short today we will bring that

42

00:02:11,589 --> 00:02:09,200

organization out of the shadows

43

00:02:12,390 --> 00:02:11,599

this hearing and oversight work

44

00:02:16,070 --> 00:02:12,400

has

45

00:02:19,030 --> 00:02:16,080

a simple idea at its core

46

00:02:21,589 --> 00:02:19,040

unidentified aerial phenomena are a

47

00:02:23,510 --> 00:02:21,599

potential national security threat and

48

00:02:26,229 --> 00:02:23,520

they need to be treated that way for too

49

00:02:27,830 --> 00:02:26,239

long the stigma associated with uaps has

50

00:02:29,110 --> 00:02:27,840

gotten in the way of good intelligence

51

00:02:31,350 --> 00:02:29,120

analysis

52

00:02:33,030 --> 00:02:31,360

pilots avoided reporting or were laughed

53

00:02:35,190 --> 00:02:33,040

at when they did

54

00:02:37,190 --> 00:02:35,200

dod officials relegated the issue to the

55

00:02:38,309 --> 00:02:37,200

back room or swept it under the rug

56

00:02:40,869 --> 00:02:38,319

entirely

57

00:02:42,869 --> 00:02:40,879

fearful of a skeptical national security

58

00:02:44,229 --> 00:02:42,879

community today

59

00:02:47,030 --> 00:02:44,239

we know better

60

00:02:48,390 --> 00:02:47,040

uaps are unexplained it's true

61

00:02:50,390 --> 00:02:48,400

but they are real

62

00:02:53,190 --> 00:02:50,400

they need to be investigated and many

63

00:02:56,630 --> 00:02:53,200

threats they pose need to be mitigated

64

00:02:59,270 --> 00:02:56,640

under secretary moultrie mr bray

65

00:03:01,270 --> 00:02:59,280

thank you for coming today

66

00:03:03,430 --> 00:03:01,280

first we need you to update us on the

67

00:03:05,430 --> 00:03:03,440

status of aim salk

68

00:03:07,190 --> 00:03:05,440

the legislation creating it was passed

69

00:03:09,430 --> 00:03:07,200

in december the deadline for

70

00:03:12,149 --> 00:03:09,440

implementation is fast approaching

71

00:03:13,509 --> 00:03:12,159

but the group does not even have a name

72

00:03:16,149 --> 00:03:13,519

director

73

00:03:18,470 --> 00:03:16,159

we need to know sirs the status of the

74

00:03:20,229 --> 00:03:18,480

organization in the obstacle to getting

75

00:03:21,509 --> 00:03:20,239

it up and running

76

00:03:24,229 --> 00:03:21,519

secondly

77

00:03:25,990 --> 00:03:24,239

you have to convince the audience today

78

00:03:29,750 --> 00:03:26,000

and most especially

79

00:03:31,270 --> 00:03:29,760

our military and civilian aviators

80

00:03:33,589 --> 00:03:31,280

the culture

81

00:03:35,830 --> 00:03:33,599

has changed

82

00:03:38,949 --> 00:03:35,840

that those who report uaps will be

83

00:03:41,110 --> 00:03:38,959

treated as witnesses not as kooks

84

00:03:44,149 --> 00:03:41,120

thirdly you need to show us

85

00:03:46,470 --> 00:03:44,159

congress and the american public whose

86

00:03:48,309 --> 00:03:46,480

imagination you have captured

87

00:03:49,910 --> 00:03:48,319

you are willing to follow the facts

88

00:03:51,910 --> 00:03:49,920

where they lead

89

00:03:54,070 --> 00:03:51,920

you know we fear sometimes that the dod

90

00:03:55,830 --> 00:03:54,080

is focused more on emphasizing what it

91

00:03:58,789 --> 00:03:55,840

can explain

92

00:04:01,509 --> 00:03:58,799

not investigating what it can

93

00:04:03,509 --> 00:04:01,519

i'm looking for you to assure us today

94

00:04:05,670 --> 00:04:03,519

that all conclusions are on the table

95

00:04:08,470 --> 00:04:05,680

one final note we are mindful today that

96

00:04:10,550 --> 00:04:08,480

aimsawg is not starting from scratch

97

00:04:13,190 --> 00:04:10,560

this is the third version of this task

98

00:04:16,949 --> 00:04:13,200

force in dod and civil society groups

99

00:04:18,789 --> 00:04:16,959

like the mutual ufo network

100

00:04:21,349 --> 00:04:18,799

mr corbell and others have been

101
00:04:22,950 --> 00:04:21,359
collecting data on this issue for years

102
00:04:24,790 --> 00:04:22,960
i hope you'll explain how you can

103
00:04:27,350 --> 00:04:24,800
leverage the knowledge and experience of

104
00:04:30,230 --> 00:04:27,360
our prior work on this matter to move

105
00:04:32,870 --> 00:04:30,240
the aim saw along the last time congress

106
00:04:33,749 --> 00:04:32,880
had a hearing on uaps was half a century

107
00:04:36,150 --> 00:04:33,759
ago

108
00:04:37,749 --> 00:04:36,160
i hope that it does not take 50 more

109
00:04:39,510 --> 00:04:37,759
years for congress to hold another

110
00:04:41,590 --> 00:04:39,520
because transparency is desperately

111
00:04:44,550 --> 00:04:41,600
needed i now turn to ranking member

112
00:04:46,710 --> 00:04:44,560
crawford for comments he'd like to make

113
00:04:48,150 --> 00:04:46,720

thank you mr chairman um honorable

114

00:04:50,310 --> 00:04:48,160

moultrie mr bray thank you for coming

115

00:04:51,909 --> 00:04:50,320

here today we appreciate it to begin the

116

00:04:54,150 --> 00:04:51,919

open dialogue between congress and the

117

00:04:55,830 --> 00:04:54,160

executive branch on this important topic

118

00:04:57,830 --> 00:04:55,840

while this topic evokes creative

119

00:04:59,510 --> 00:04:57,840

imaginations of many aside from all the

120

00:05:02,870 --> 00:04:59,520

hype and speculation there are important

121

00:05:04,550 --> 00:05:02,880

underlying issues posed by uaps despite

122

00:05:05,830 --> 00:05:04,560

the serious nature of this topic i have

123

00:05:07,270 --> 00:05:05,840

to say i'm more interested in our

124

00:05:08,710 --> 00:05:07,280

understanding of chinese and russian

125

00:05:10,230 --> 00:05:08,720

hypersonic weapon development or

126
00:05:12,469 --> 00:05:10,240
understanding why this administration

127
00:05:14,710 --> 00:05:12,479
was so slow to share actionable

128
00:05:16,230 --> 00:05:14,720
intelligence with the ukrainians however

129
00:05:17,990 --> 00:05:16,240
as much as this topic may help us better

130
00:05:21,110 --> 00:05:18,000
understand unknown activities of russia

131
00:05:22,870 --> 00:05:21,120
and china i am on board the intelligence

132
00:05:24,310 --> 00:05:22,880
community has a serious duty to our

133
00:05:26,310 --> 00:05:24,320
taxpayers to prevent potential

134
00:05:28,390 --> 00:05:26,320
adversaries such as china and russia

135
00:05:30,230 --> 00:05:28,400
from surprising us with unforeseen new

136
00:05:31,749 --> 00:05:30,240
technologies

137
00:05:32,950 --> 00:05:31,759
as overseers of the intelligence

138
00:05:35,110 --> 00:05:32,960

community this committee has an

139

00:05:37,110 --> 00:05:35,120

obligation to understand what you are

140

00:05:39,590 --> 00:05:37,120

doing to determine whether any uaps are

141

00:05:41,990 --> 00:05:39,600

new technologies or not and if they are

142

00:05:43,749 --> 00:05:42,000

where they coming from in general the ic

143

00:05:45,749 --> 00:05:43,759

spends much of its time and resources

144

00:05:47,670 --> 00:05:45,759

trying to understand what we call known

145

00:05:49,590 --> 00:05:47,680

unknowns when it comes to foreign

146

00:05:51,189 --> 00:05:49,600

nations weapons systems and sensors

147

00:05:53,350 --> 00:05:51,199

known unknowns are those features that

148

00:05:55,430 --> 00:05:53,360

we don't fully understand yet the

149

00:05:57,430 --> 00:05:55,440

challenge associated with uap is that

150

00:05:59,189 --> 00:05:57,440

they are completely unknown and require

151

00:06:01,350 --> 00:05:59,199

a more expansive collection analysis

152

00:06:03,350 --> 00:06:01,360

effort the intelligence community must

153

00:06:05,189 --> 00:06:03,360

balance addressing known threats to our

154

00:06:07,510 --> 00:06:05,199

nation national security with preventing

155

00:06:08,950 --> 00:06:07,520

technical surprise we must continue to

156

00:06:10,469 --> 00:06:08,960

follow the facts where they lead us and

157

00:06:13,110 --> 00:06:10,479

ensure that there are no technical

158

00:06:14,790 --> 00:06:13,120

surprises the ic must take it seriously

159

00:06:16,790 --> 00:06:14,800

when there are credible observations of

160

00:06:18,870 --> 00:06:16,800

phenomena that seem to perform in ways

161

00:06:20,390 --> 00:06:18,880

that could pose a threat to safe flight

162

00:06:22,150 --> 00:06:20,400

operations or they could be signs of a

163

00:06:23,189 --> 00:06:22,160

foreign adversary's attempt to develop a

164

00:06:25,189 --> 00:06:23,199

strategic

165

00:06:26,550 --> 00:06:25,199

technological surprise against the

166

00:06:28,150 --> 00:06:26,560

united states

167

00:06:30,390 --> 00:06:28,160

it's also essential that our pilots and

168

00:06:33,990 --> 00:06:30,400

others feel they can report uaps they

169

00:06:36,230 --> 00:06:34,000

observe without any stigma for doing so

170

00:06:37,749 --> 00:06:36,240

this is the open unclassified portion of

171

00:06:40,070 --> 00:06:37,759

our hearing we'll have a closed

172

00:06:41,270 --> 00:06:40,080

classified part later it's important for

173

00:06:43,590 --> 00:06:41,280

the public to know that the

174

00:06:45,990 --> 00:06:43,600

classification of information exists to

175

00:06:47,749 --> 00:06:46,000

protect national security not to try to

176

00:06:49,589 --> 00:06:47,759

hide the truth when we're trying to

177

00:06:51,350 --> 00:06:49,599

determine if any uaps are new

178

00:06:53,510 --> 00:06:51,360

technologies being developed by foreign

179

00:06:55,589 --> 00:06:53,520

governments we are inevitably going to

180

00:06:57,749 --> 00:06:55,599

run into classified information about

181

00:07:00,070 --> 00:06:57,759

what new systems and technologies we do

182

00:07:02,309 --> 00:07:00,080

know or in the works here or abroad but

183

00:07:03,830 --> 00:07:02,319

where information does not risk national

184

00:07:05,990 --> 00:07:03,840

security it should be shared with our

185

00:07:07,510 --> 00:07:06,000

allies and the public when feasible i

186

00:07:09,189 --> 00:07:07,520

hope that we can have your assurance to

187

00:07:10,550 --> 00:07:09,199

this end today it's my hope that the

188

00:07:12,390 --> 00:07:10,560

intelligence community will continue to

189

00:07:14,390 --> 00:07:12,400

try to determine the nature of uaps

190

00:07:15,990 --> 00:07:14,400

we've observed and will keep congress

191

00:07:16,950 --> 00:07:16,000

fully apprised of all developments i

192

00:07:18,870 --> 00:07:16,960

look forward to this hearing and

193

00:07:21,270 --> 00:07:18,880

continue continue dialoguing oversight

194

00:07:23,110 --> 00:07:21,280

with the intelligence community on this

195

00:07:24,790 --> 00:07:23,120

topic without a yield back

196

00:07:26,070 --> 00:07:24,800

gentleman yields back and now we'll turn

197

00:07:27,430 --> 00:07:26,080

to our distinguished chairman adam

198

00:07:28,309 --> 00:07:27,440

schiff for any comments he wishes to

199

00:07:30,309 --> 00:07:28,319

make

200

00:07:32,550 --> 00:07:30,319

thank you chairman carson uh for holding

201
00:07:34,469 --> 00:07:32,560
this open hearing on unidentified aerial

202
00:07:35,670 --> 00:07:34,479
phenomenon and for your leadership on

203
00:07:37,029 --> 00:07:35,680
this issue

204
00:07:39,749 --> 00:07:37,039
holding a portion of our discussion

205
00:07:42,150 --> 00:07:39,759
today in open session is critical to the

206
00:07:43,749 --> 00:07:42,160
cause of transparency and openness

207
00:07:45,589 --> 00:07:43,759
which was congress's intent in

208
00:07:46,790 --> 00:07:45,599
authorizing and funding this new task

209
00:07:48,150 --> 00:07:46,800
force

210
00:07:50,790 --> 00:07:48,160
the larger effort that is being

211
00:07:51,909 --> 00:07:50,800
undertaken to study and characterize uap

212
00:07:53,270 --> 00:07:51,919
reports

213
00:07:55,350 --> 00:07:53,280

is an important step towards

214

00:07:57,110 --> 00:07:55,360

understanding these phenomenon what we

215

00:07:58,790 --> 00:07:57,120

know and don't know

216

00:08:00,309 --> 00:07:58,800

and i look forward to hearing more

217

00:08:01,589 --> 00:08:00,319

during both the open session and the

218

00:08:04,710 --> 00:08:01,599

closed setting

219

00:08:06,150 --> 00:08:04,720

about how dod and the ic are undertaking

220

00:08:08,309 --> 00:08:06,160

that task

221

00:08:09,990 --> 00:08:08,319

uap reports have been around for decades

222

00:08:12,469 --> 00:08:10,000

and yet we haven't had an orderly way

223

00:08:14,390 --> 00:08:12,479

for them to be reported without stigma

224

00:08:16,710 --> 00:08:14,400

and to be investigated

225

00:08:18,710 --> 00:08:16,720

that needs to change uap reports need to

226

00:08:20,790 --> 00:08:18,720

be understood as a national security

227

00:08:23,029 --> 00:08:20,800

matter and that message needs to go out

228

00:08:24,309 --> 00:08:23,039

across dod the ic and the whole of the

229

00:08:25,589 --> 00:08:24,319

u.s government

230

00:08:27,670 --> 00:08:25,599

when we spot something we don't

231

00:08:29,430 --> 00:08:27,680

understand or can't identify in our

232

00:08:31,589 --> 00:08:29,440

airspace it's the job of those we

233

00:08:33,990 --> 00:08:31,599

entrust with our national security to

234

00:08:35,589 --> 00:08:34,000

investigate and to report back

235

00:08:37,350 --> 00:08:35,599

that is why it's important that we hold

236

00:08:39,670 --> 00:08:37,360

this open hearing for the public to hear

237

00:08:41,909 --> 00:08:39,680

directly from the department of defense

238

00:08:44,230 --> 00:08:41,919

on the steps it's taking to track

239

00:08:45,670 --> 00:08:44,240

analyze and transparently communicate

240

00:08:46,630 --> 00:08:45,680

the work that is being done on this

241

00:08:48,310 --> 00:08:46,640

issue

242

00:08:49,750 --> 00:08:48,320

it is also the responsibility of our

243

00:08:51,110 --> 00:08:49,760

government and this panel to share as

244

00:08:53,350 --> 00:08:51,120

much as we can

245

00:08:55,430 --> 00:08:53,360

with the american people since excessive

246

00:08:57,350 --> 00:08:55,440

secrecy only breeds distrust and

247

00:08:59,030 --> 00:08:57,360

speculation

248

00:09:00,630 --> 00:08:59,040

i look forward to hearing how the uap

249

00:09:02,470 --> 00:09:00,640

task force is being stood up what

250

00:09:03,990 --> 00:09:02,480

challenges they still face

251
00:09:06,389 --> 00:09:04,000
and how this committee can make sure the

252
00:09:09,110 --> 00:09:06,399
task force is able to shed light on one

253
00:09:11,590 --> 00:09:09,120
of the world's most enduring mysteries

254
00:09:13,829 --> 00:09:11,600
i thank you gentlemen for your work and

255
00:09:14,870 --> 00:09:13,839
i'll be very interested to hear what you

256
00:09:16,790 --> 00:09:14,880
have to say

257
00:09:18,150 --> 00:09:16,800
to me among the most fascinating

258
00:09:20,790 --> 00:09:18,160
questions

259
00:09:23,590 --> 00:09:20,800
are these phenomena that we can

260
00:09:25,990 --> 00:09:23,600
measure that is uh instruments report

261
00:09:27,110 --> 00:09:26,000
there is something there it is not the

262
00:09:29,509 --> 00:09:27,120
human eye

263
00:09:31,190 --> 00:09:29,519

confusing objects in the sky

264

00:09:33,190 --> 00:09:31,200

there is something there measurable by

265

00:09:35,509 --> 00:09:33,200

multiple instruments and yet it seems to

266

00:09:37,990 --> 00:09:35,519

move in directions that are inconsistent

267

00:09:39,829 --> 00:09:38,000

with what we know of physics or science

268

00:09:42,790 --> 00:09:39,839

more broadly and

269

00:09:44,710 --> 00:09:42,800

uh that to me poses uh questions of of

270

00:09:47,190 --> 00:09:44,720

tremendous interest and

271

00:09:49,110 --> 00:09:47,200

as well as potential national security

272

00:09:50,550 --> 00:09:49,120

significance so we look forward to

273

00:09:51,990 --> 00:09:50,560

hearing what you're able to report to us

274

00:09:54,470 --> 00:09:52,000

today in open session and i want to

275

00:09:56,310 --> 00:09:54,480

thank chairman carson again for his

276
00:09:58,310 --> 00:09:56,320
extraordinary leadership on this issue

277
00:10:00,389 --> 00:09:58,320
and i yield back

278
00:10:01,509 --> 00:10:00,399
chairman yul's back thank you with that

279
00:10:04,069 --> 00:10:01,519
we will start our hearing under

280
00:10:06,230 --> 00:10:04,079
secretary moultrie the floor is your sir

281
00:10:07,509 --> 00:10:06,240
thank you

282
00:10:09,509 --> 00:10:07,519
chairman schiff

283
00:10:11,190 --> 00:10:09,519
committee chairman carson ranking member

284
00:10:13,350 --> 00:10:11,200
crawford distinguished members of the

285
00:10:15,110 --> 00:10:13,360
subcommittee it's a privilege to be here

286
00:10:17,269 --> 00:10:15,120
with you today to address your questions

287
00:10:18,710 --> 00:10:17,279
regarding unidentified aerial phenomena

288
00:10:20,550 --> 00:10:18,720

or uap

289

00:10:22,550 --> 00:10:20,560

i'm pleased to be joined by mr scott

290

00:10:23,829 --> 00:10:22,560

bray the deputy director of naval

291

00:10:26,150 --> 00:10:23,839

intelligence who will speak to the

292

00:10:28,550 --> 00:10:26,160

navy's unidentified aerial phenomenon

293

00:10:31,110 --> 00:10:28,560

task force which laid the foundation for

294

00:10:32,710 --> 00:10:31,120

the efforts we will discuss today

295

00:10:35,350 --> 00:10:32,720

first i'd like to thank congress for

296

00:10:38,790 --> 00:10:35,360

supporting the department's uap efforts

297

00:10:41,190 --> 00:10:38,800

the ndaa for fiscal year 2022 has helped

298

00:10:43,590 --> 00:10:41,200

us to establish a dedicated office to

299

00:10:46,310 --> 00:10:43,600

oversee processes and procedures for the

300

00:10:49,190 --> 00:10:46,320

timey collection processing analysis and

301
00:10:50,710 --> 00:10:49,200
reporting of uap related data

302
00:10:53,910 --> 00:10:50,720
what are you ap

303
00:10:56,470 --> 00:10:53,920
put simply uap or airborne objects that

304
00:10:57,750 --> 00:10:56,480
when encountered cannot be immediately

305
00:10:59,269 --> 00:10:57,760
identified

306
00:11:00,470 --> 00:10:59,279
however it is the department's

307
00:11:02,230 --> 00:11:00,480
contention

308
00:11:04,710 --> 00:11:02,240
that by combining appropriately

309
00:11:06,389 --> 00:11:04,720
structured collected data with rigorous

310
00:11:08,710 --> 00:11:06,399
scientific analysis

311
00:11:11,030 --> 00:11:08,720
any object that we encounter

312
00:11:14,230 --> 00:11:11,040
can likely be

313
00:11:17,269 --> 00:11:14,240

isolated characterized identified and if

314

00:11:19,990 --> 00:11:17,279

necessary mitigated

315

00:11:22,389 --> 00:11:20,000

we know that our service members have

316

00:11:25,030 --> 00:11:22,399

encountered unidentified aerial

317

00:11:26,630 --> 00:11:25,040

phenomena and because uaps pose

318

00:11:29,269 --> 00:11:26,640

potential flight safety and general

319

00:11:30,790 --> 00:11:29,279

security risk we are committed to a

320

00:11:32,310 --> 00:11:30,800

focused effort to determine their

321

00:11:34,069 --> 00:11:32,320

origins

322

00:11:35,670 --> 00:11:34,079

our effort will include the thorough

323

00:11:37,750 --> 00:11:35,680

examination of

324

00:11:40,310 --> 00:11:37,760

adversarial platforms and potential

325

00:11:43,190 --> 00:11:40,320

breakthrough technologies us government

326

00:11:46,550 --> 00:11:43,200

or commercial platforms allied or

327

00:11:49,670 --> 00:11:46,560

partner systems and other natural

328

00:11:55,030 --> 00:11:51,990

we also understand that there has been a

329

00:11:57,269 --> 00:11:55,040

cultural stigma surrounding uap

330

00:11:59,110 --> 00:11:57,279

our goal is to eliminate the stigma by

331

00:12:01,350 --> 00:11:59,120

fully incorporating our operators and

332

00:12:03,590 --> 00:12:01,360

mission personnel into a standardized

333

00:12:06,949 --> 00:12:03,600

data gathering process

334

00:12:09,430 --> 00:12:06,959

we believe that making uap reporting a

335

00:12:11,190 --> 00:12:09,440

mission imperative will be instrumental

336

00:12:12,870 --> 00:12:11,200

to the effort's success

337

00:12:14,790 --> 00:12:12,880

the defense intelligence and security

338

00:12:16,629 --> 00:12:14,800

enterprise provides real-time support to

339

00:12:18,389 --> 00:12:16,639

our war fighters and mission personnel

340

00:12:21,350 --> 00:12:18,399

across all domains

341

00:12:23,190 --> 00:12:21,360

to optimize the department's uap work we

342

00:12:24,949 --> 00:12:23,200

are establishing an office

343

00:12:26,150 --> 00:12:24,959

within the office of the secretary of

344

00:12:28,629 --> 00:12:26,160

defense

345

00:12:30,310 --> 00:12:28,639

that office's function is clear to

346

00:12:32,389 --> 00:12:30,320

facilitate the identification of

347

00:12:35,110 --> 00:12:32,399

previously unknown or unidentified

348

00:12:37,110 --> 00:12:35,120

airborne objects in a methodical logical

349

00:12:39,430 --> 00:12:37,120

and standardized manner

350

00:12:40,949 --> 00:12:39,440

these goals will ensure that we are

351
00:12:42,629 --> 00:12:40,959
working closely with operational

352
00:12:45,030 --> 00:12:42,639
personnel on training and reporting

353
00:12:46,870 --> 00:12:45,040
requirements developing data and

354
00:12:48,949 --> 00:12:46,880
intelligence requirements

355
00:12:50,470 --> 00:12:48,959
standardizing and integrating processes

356
00:12:52,470 --> 00:12:50,480
and procedures for collection

357
00:12:54,790 --> 00:12:52,480
operational surveillance analysis and

358
00:12:56,710 --> 00:12:54,800
reporting leveraging our research and

359
00:12:58,949 --> 00:12:56,720
development capabilities to improve

360
00:13:01,509 --> 00:12:58,959
detection characterization and

361
00:13:03,829 --> 00:13:01,519
identification of uaps developing

362
00:13:05,590 --> 00:13:03,839
mitigating solutions and procedures and

363
00:13:07,030 --> 00:13:05,600

identifying strategy and policy

364

00:13:09,030 --> 00:13:07,040

solutions

365

00:13:10,870 --> 00:13:09,040

this effort will maximize collaboration

366

00:13:12,710 --> 00:13:10,880

and build upon already existing

367

00:13:14,710 --> 00:13:12,720

relationships with the office of the

368

00:13:18,470 --> 00:13:14,720

director of national intelligence the

369

00:13:20,069 --> 00:13:18,480

faa dhs and the fbi

370

00:13:21,269 --> 00:13:20,079

we are also committed to strong

371

00:13:25,269 --> 00:13:21,279

partnerships with the department of

372

00:13:27,509 --> 00:13:25,279

energy noaa the dea nasa

373

00:13:29,430 --> 00:13:27,519

and the national labs and just as

374

00:13:31,030 --> 00:13:29,440

importantly our international partners

375

00:13:32,829 --> 00:13:31,040

and allies

376

00:13:35,430 --> 00:13:32,839

with regard to the importance of

377

00:13:37,910 --> 00:13:35,440

transparency the department is fully

378

00:13:39,750 --> 00:13:37,920

committed to the principle of openness

379

00:13:40,949 --> 00:13:39,760

and accountability to the american

380

00:13:43,110 --> 00:13:40,959

people

381

00:13:45,430 --> 00:13:43,120

however we are also mindful of our

382

00:13:47,509 --> 00:13:45,440

obligation to protect sensitive sources

383

00:13:48,949 --> 00:13:47,519

and methods our goal is to strike that

384

00:13:50,710 --> 00:13:48,959

delicate balance

385

00:13:53,030 --> 00:13:50,720

one that enables us to maintain the

386

00:13:54,710 --> 00:13:53,040

public's trust while preserving those

387

00:13:58,230 --> 00:13:54,720

capabilities that are vital to the

388

00:14:00,389 --> 00:13:58,240

support of our service personnel

389

00:14:01,670 --> 00:14:00,399

in closing the department is committed

390

00:14:03,430 --> 00:14:01,680

to this effort and welcomes the

391

00:14:04,790 --> 00:14:03,440

challenge we thank you for your

392

00:14:11,829 --> 00:14:04,800

committed support

393

00:14:15,509 --> 00:14:13,829

chairman chief chairman carson ranking

394

00:14:17,189 --> 00:14:15,519

member crawford and committee members

395

00:14:18,389 --> 00:14:17,199

thank you very much for the opportunity

396

00:14:19,590 --> 00:14:18,399

to be here today to highlight the

397

00:14:22,069 --> 00:14:19,600

ongoing work of the department of

398

00:14:25,590 --> 00:14:22,079

defense regarding unidentified aerial

399

00:14:27,670 --> 00:14:25,600

phenomena since the early 2000s

400

00:14:29,829 --> 00:14:27,680

we have seen an increasing number of

401
00:14:30,870 --> 00:14:29,839
unauthorized and or unidentified

402
00:14:33,030 --> 00:14:30,880
aircraft or objects in

403
00:14:34,949 --> 00:14:33,040
military-controlled training areas

404
00:14:35,990 --> 00:14:34,959
and training ranges and other designated

405
00:14:38,310 --> 00:14:36,000
airspace

406
00:14:39,590 --> 00:14:38,320
reports of sightings are frequent and

407
00:14:41,590 --> 00:14:39,600
continuing

408
00:14:43,269 --> 00:14:41,600
we attribute this increase in reporting

409
00:14:45,590 --> 00:14:43,279
to a number of factors including our

410
00:14:47,590 --> 00:14:45,600
work to destigmatize reporting an

411
00:14:49,590 --> 00:14:47,600
increase in the number of new systems

412
00:14:51,829 --> 00:14:49,600
such as quadcopters and unmanned aerial

413
00:14:53,509 --> 00:14:51,839

systems that are in our airspace

414

00:14:55,430 --> 00:14:53,519

identification of what we can classify

415

00:14:57,509 --> 00:14:55,440

as clutter mylar balloons and other

416

00:14:59,430 --> 00:14:57,519

types of air trash

417

00:15:01,750 --> 00:14:59,440

and improvements in the capabilities of

418

00:15:03,350 --> 00:15:01,760

our various sensors to detect things in

419

00:15:05,269 --> 00:15:03,360

our airspace

420

00:15:06,710 --> 00:15:05,279

almost two years ago in august of 2020

421

00:15:07,990 --> 00:15:06,720

deputy secretary defense nordquist

422

00:15:10,310 --> 00:15:08,000

directed the establishment of the

423

00:15:12,870 --> 00:15:10,320

unidentified aerial phenomena task force

424

00:15:14,710 --> 00:15:12,880

within the department of the navy the

425

00:15:16,949 --> 00:15:14,720

uap task force was built on the

426

00:15:18,470 --> 00:15:16,959

foundation of the navy's initial efforts

427

00:15:21,030 --> 00:15:18,480

to respond to the reports from our

428

00:15:23,030 --> 00:15:21,040

aviators on unidentified objects

429

00:15:25,509 --> 00:15:23,040

observed in our training ranges

430

00:15:26,470 --> 00:15:25,519

the basic issues then and now are

431

00:15:27,509 --> 00:15:26,480

twofold

432

00:15:29,189 --> 00:15:27,519

first

433

00:15:31,189 --> 00:15:29,199

incursions in our training ranges by

434

00:15:33,189 --> 00:15:31,199

unidentified objects represent serious

435

00:15:36,310 --> 00:15:33,199

hazards to safety of flight

436

00:15:38,629 --> 00:15:36,320

in every aspect of naval aviation safety

437

00:15:39,749 --> 00:15:38,639

of our air crews is paramount

438

00:15:41,749 --> 00:15:39,759

second

439

00:15:43,990 --> 00:15:41,759

intrusions by unknown aircraft or

440

00:15:46,790 --> 00:15:44,000

objects pose potential threats to the

441

00:15:49,110 --> 00:15:46,800

security of our operations our aviators

442

00:15:51,269 --> 00:15:49,120

train as they would fight

443

00:15:53,350 --> 00:15:51,279

so any intrusions that may compromise

444

00:15:55,590 --> 00:15:53,360

the security of our operations by

445

00:15:57,430 --> 00:15:55,600

revealing our capabilities our tactics

446

00:15:59,910 --> 00:15:57,440

techniques or procedures

447

00:16:01,829 --> 00:15:59,920

are of great concern to the navy and the

448

00:16:03,829 --> 00:16:01,839

department of defense

449

00:16:06,949 --> 00:16:03,839

from the very beginning we took these

450

00:16:08,710 --> 00:16:06,959

reports very seriously we instituted a

451
00:16:10,470 --> 00:16:08,720
data-driven approach to the

452
00:16:12,629 --> 00:16:10,480
investigations where we could collect as

453
00:16:15,030 --> 00:16:12,639
much data as possible and use all

454
00:16:16,470 --> 00:16:15,040
available resources to analyze and make

455
00:16:18,949 --> 00:16:16,480
informed decisions on the best ways to

456
00:16:21,670 --> 00:16:18,959
address our findings our main objective

457
00:16:24,389 --> 00:16:21,680
was to transition uap efforts from an

458
00:16:27,030 --> 00:16:24,399
anecdotal or narrative based

459
00:16:29,990 --> 00:16:27,040
approach to a rigorous science and

460
00:16:31,910 --> 00:16:30,000
technology engineering focused study

461
00:16:33,910 --> 00:16:31,920
this data-driven approach

462
00:16:35,269 --> 00:16:33,920
requires input from a wide variety of

463
00:16:37,509 --> 00:16:35,279

sources

464

00:16:38,870 --> 00:16:37,519
in the early stages the task force

465

00:16:40,790 --> 00:16:38,880
worked to standardize the reporting

466

00:16:42,310 --> 00:16:40,800
mechanisms and processes to make it as

467

00:16:44,150 --> 00:16:42,320
easy as possible

468

00:16:46,069 --> 00:16:44,160
for personnel to report any engagement

469

00:16:47,910 --> 00:16:46,079
so that we were getting that wide range

470

00:16:49,910 --> 00:16:47,920
of reporting that we needed

471

00:16:51,350 --> 00:16:49,920
we also spent considerable efforts

472

00:16:53,189 --> 00:16:51,360
engaging directly with our naval

473

00:16:55,829 --> 00:16:53,199
aviators and building relationships to

474

00:16:57,749 --> 00:16:55,839
help destigmatize the act of reporting

475

00:16:59,509 --> 00:16:57,759
sightings or encounters

476

00:17:00,870 --> 00:16:59,519

and we worked with naval aviation

477

00:17:03,670 --> 00:17:00,880

leadership to provide additional

478

00:17:05,829 --> 00:17:03,680

equipment to record any encounter navy

479

00:17:07,590 --> 00:17:05,839

and air force crews now have

480

00:17:10,150 --> 00:17:07,600

step-by-step procedures for reporting on

481

00:17:12,549 --> 00:17:10,160

the uap on their knee board

482

00:17:13,829 --> 00:17:12,559

in their in the cockpit and

483

00:17:16,390 --> 00:17:13,839

in their post

484

00:17:18,390 --> 00:17:16,400

flight debrief procedures

485

00:17:20,630 --> 00:17:18,400

the direct result of those efforts has

486

00:17:21,990 --> 00:17:20,640

been increased reporting with increased

487

00:17:24,710 --> 00:17:22,000

opportunities to focus a number of

488

00:17:25,829 --> 00:17:24,720

sensors on any objects the message is

489

00:17:27,909 --> 00:17:25,839

now clear

490

00:17:28,630 --> 00:17:27,919

if you see something you need to report

491

00:17:30,470 --> 00:17:28,640

it

492

00:17:33,029 --> 00:17:30,480

and the message has been received in

493

00:17:34,549 --> 00:17:33,039

fact recently i received a call from a

494

00:17:35,669 --> 00:17:34,559

senior naval aviator with over two

495

00:17:38,150 --> 00:17:35,679

thousand flight hours he called me

496

00:17:41,590 --> 00:17:38,160

personally from the flight line uh after

497

00:17:44,390 --> 00:17:41,600

landing uh to talk about uh an encounter

498

00:17:46,070 --> 00:17:44,400

that he had just experienced

499

00:17:47,510 --> 00:17:46,080

those were just the initial steps we

500

00:17:48,870 --> 00:17:47,520

also made a concerted effort to assemble

501
00:17:49,830 --> 00:17:48,880
subject matter experts from across the

502
00:17:51,510 --> 00:17:49,840
department of defense in the

503
00:17:53,270 --> 00:17:51,520
intelligence community and other us

504
00:17:54,630 --> 00:17:53,280
government agencies and departments we

505
00:17:56,310 --> 00:17:54,640
forged partnerships with the research

506
00:17:57,990 --> 00:17:56,320
development and acquisition communities

507
00:17:59,990 --> 00:17:58,000
with industry partners and with academic

508
00:18:02,150 --> 00:18:00,000
research labs and we've brought many

509
00:18:04,630 --> 00:18:02,160
allies and international partners into

510
00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:04,640
our discussions on uap

511
00:18:08,630 --> 00:18:06,480
additionally subject matter experts from

512
00:18:12,390 --> 00:18:08,640
a wide variety of fields including

513
00:18:14,950 --> 00:18:12,400

physics optics metallurgy meteorology

514

00:18:17,110 --> 00:18:14,960

just name a few have been brought in to

515

00:18:19,430 --> 00:18:17,120

uh uh to expand our understanding in

516

00:18:20,630 --> 00:18:19,440

areas where me we may not have organic

517

00:18:22,310 --> 00:18:20,640

expertise

518

00:18:24,710 --> 00:18:22,320

in short we've endeavored to bring an

519

00:18:26,789 --> 00:18:24,720

all hands on deck approach uh to the to

520

00:18:29,270 --> 00:18:26,799

better understand this phenomena so what

521

00:18:32,710 --> 00:18:29,280

have we learned so far

522

00:18:36,150 --> 00:18:32,720

any given observation may be fleeting

523

00:18:39,350 --> 00:18:36,160

or longer it may be recorded or not it

524

00:18:41,110 --> 00:18:39,360

may be observable by one or multiple

525

00:18:43,510 --> 00:18:41,120

assets

526

00:18:44,950 --> 00:18:43,520

in short there's rarely an easy answer

527

00:18:47,190 --> 00:18:44,960

for example let me share with you the

528

00:18:59,110 --> 00:18:47,200

first video that we have here today

529

00:19:01,270 --> 00:19:00,470

there it was

530

00:19:03,110 --> 00:19:01,280

that's

531

00:19:06,549 --> 00:19:03,120

in many cases

532

00:19:08,630 --> 00:19:06,559

that's all that a report may include

533

00:19:12,150 --> 00:19:08,640

and in many other cases

534

00:19:14,150 --> 00:19:12,160

we have far less than this

535

00:19:15,430 --> 00:19:14,160

as we detailed in both the unclassified

536

00:19:16,789 --> 00:19:15,440

and classified versions of the

537

00:19:17,750 --> 00:19:16,799

preliminary assessment released by the

538

00:19:19,750 --> 00:19:17,760

office of the director of national

539

00:19:22,710 --> 00:19:19,760

intelligence last june this often

540

00:19:24,310 --> 00:19:22,720

limited amount of high quality data

541

00:19:26,230 --> 00:19:24,320

and reporting hampers our ability to

542

00:19:28,150 --> 00:19:26,240

draw firm conclusions about the nature

543

00:19:30,310 --> 00:19:28,160

or intent of uap

544

00:19:31,830 --> 00:19:30,320

as detailed in the odni report if and

545

00:19:34,390 --> 00:19:31,840

when individual uap incidents are

546

00:19:36,470 --> 00:19:34,400

resolved they likely fall into one of

547

00:19:38,710 --> 00:19:36,480

five potential explanatory categories

548

00:19:41,190 --> 00:19:38,720

airborne clutter natural atmospheric

549

00:19:43,430 --> 00:19:41,200

phenomena us government or u.s industry

550

00:19:45,110 --> 00:19:43,440

developmental programs foreign adversary

551
00:19:45,830 --> 00:19:45,120
systems or

552
00:19:53,590 --> 00:19:45,840
a

553
00:19:56,070 --> 00:19:53,600
scientific discovery

554
00:19:57,350 --> 00:19:56,080
we stand by those initial results

555
00:19:59,750 --> 00:19:57,360
since the release of that preliminary

556
00:20:02,710 --> 00:19:59,760
report the uap task force database has

557
00:20:04,070 --> 00:20:02,720
now grown to contain approximately 400

558
00:20:07,029 --> 00:20:04,080
reports

559
00:20:08,470 --> 00:20:07,039
the stigma has been reduced

560
00:20:10,310 --> 00:20:08,480
we've also made progress in resolving

561
00:20:11,909 --> 00:20:10,320
the character of a limited number of uap

562
00:20:14,710 --> 00:20:11,919
encounters for example let me show you a

563
00:20:18,470 --> 00:20:14,720

couple of another video and image

564

00:20:21,029 --> 00:20:18,480

taken years apart in different areas

565

00:20:22,630 --> 00:20:21,039

in this video u.s navy personnel

566

00:20:25,430 --> 00:20:22,640

recorded what appears to be triangles

567

00:20:27,590 --> 00:20:25,440

some flashing recorded several years ago

568

00:20:29,190 --> 00:20:27,600

off the coast of the united states

569

00:20:29,909 --> 00:20:29,200

this was recorded while the u.s navy

570

00:20:31,909 --> 00:20:29,919

ship

571

00:20:34,630 --> 00:20:31,919

observed a number of small unmanned

572

00:20:36,950 --> 00:20:34,640

aerial systems in the area

573

00:20:38,870 --> 00:20:36,960

importantly the video was taken through

574

00:20:40,710 --> 00:20:38,880

night vision goggles with a single lens

575

00:20:42,789 --> 00:20:40,720

reflex camera

576
00:21:06,870 --> 00:20:42,799
these remained unresolved for several

577
00:21:11,590 --> 00:21:09,430
several years later

578
00:21:14,390 --> 00:21:11,600
and off a different coast

579
00:21:16,070 --> 00:21:14,400
u.s navy personnel again in a swarm of

580
00:21:18,549 --> 00:21:16,080
unmanned aerial systems and again

581
00:21:19,830 --> 00:21:18,559
through night vision goggles and an slr

582
00:21:21,909 --> 00:21:19,840
camera

583
00:21:23,270 --> 00:21:21,919
recorded this image

584
00:21:25,110 --> 00:21:23,280
but this time

585
00:21:27,270 --> 00:21:25,120
other us navy assets also observed

586
00:21:29,830 --> 00:21:27,280
unmanned aerial systems nearby and we're

587
00:21:31,510 --> 00:21:29,840
now reasonably confident that these

588
00:21:33,909 --> 00:21:31,520

triangles correlate to unmanned aerial

589

00:21:35,110 --> 00:21:33,919

systems in the area the triangular

590

00:21:37,270 --> 00:21:35,120

appearance

591

00:21:39,190 --> 00:21:37,280

is a result of light passing through the

592

00:21:41,510 --> 00:21:39,200

night vision goggles and then being

593

00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:41,520

recorded by an slr camera

594

00:21:44,950 --> 00:21:43,280

i don't mean to suggest that everything

595

00:21:48,630 --> 00:21:44,960

that we observe

596

00:21:49,750 --> 00:21:48,640

is is identifiable but

597

00:21:52,149 --> 00:21:49,760

the um

598

00:21:54,950 --> 00:21:52,159

it but this is a great example of how it

599

00:21:56,470 --> 00:21:54,960

takes considerable effort to understand

600

00:21:58,390 --> 00:21:56,480

what we're seeing

601
00:22:00,149 --> 00:21:58,400
in the examples that we are able to

602
00:22:01,430 --> 00:22:00,159
collect um

603
00:22:03,190 --> 00:22:01,440
in this example we accumulated

604
00:22:05,190 --> 00:22:03,200
sufficient data from two similar

605
00:22:07,270 --> 00:22:05,200
encounters from two different time

606
00:22:10,310 --> 00:22:07,280
periods in two different geographic

607
00:22:12,310 --> 00:22:10,320
areas to help us draw these conclusions

608
00:22:15,110 --> 00:22:12,320
that's not always the case though we

609
00:22:17,590 --> 00:22:15,120
recognize that that can be unsatisfying

610
00:22:19,430 --> 00:22:17,600
or insufficient in the eyes of many this

611
00:22:20,630 --> 00:22:19,440
is a popular topic in our nation with

612
00:22:23,430 --> 00:22:20,640
various theories as to what these

613
00:22:24,630 --> 00:22:23,440

objects may be and where they originate

614

00:22:26,070 --> 00:22:24,640

by nature

615

00:22:28,870 --> 00:22:26,080

we are all curious and we seek to

616

00:22:31,510 --> 00:22:28,880

understand the unknown and as a lifelong

617

00:22:33,430 --> 00:22:31,520

intelligence professional i'm impatient

618

00:22:35,110 --> 00:22:33,440

i want immediate explanations for this

619

00:22:36,310 --> 00:22:35,120

as much as anyone else

620

00:22:38,149 --> 00:22:36,320

however

621

00:22:39,590 --> 00:22:38,159

understanding can take significant time

622

00:22:41,990 --> 00:22:39,600

and effort it's why we've endeavored to

623

00:22:44,470 --> 00:22:42,000

concentrate on this data-driven process

624

00:22:45,830 --> 00:22:44,480

to drive fact-based results and given

625

00:22:48,710 --> 00:22:45,840

the nature of our business national

626
00:22:50,710 --> 00:22:48,720
defense we've had to sometimes be less

627
00:22:53,270 --> 00:22:50,720
forthcoming with information in open

628
00:22:55,750 --> 00:22:53,280
forums than many would hope

629
00:22:57,190 --> 00:22:55,760
if uap do indeed represent a potential

630
00:22:59,270 --> 00:22:57,200
threat to our security then the

631
00:23:01,270 --> 00:22:59,280
capabilities systems processes and

632
00:23:03,510 --> 00:23:01,280
sources we use to observe recorded study

633
00:23:05,990 --> 00:23:03,520
or analyze these phenomena need to be

634
00:23:09,190 --> 00:23:06,000
classified at appropriate levels

635
00:23:11,350 --> 00:23:09,200
we do not want we do not want potential

636
00:23:13,669 --> 00:23:11,360
adversaries to know exactly what we're

637
00:23:16,070 --> 00:23:13,679
able to see or understand or how we come

638
00:23:16,950 --> 00:23:16,080

to the conclusions we make therefore

639

00:23:19,190 --> 00:23:16,960

public

640

00:23:21,190 --> 00:23:19,200

disclosures must be carefully considered

641

00:23:23,029 --> 00:23:21,200

on a case-by-case basis

642

00:23:24,470 --> 00:23:23,039

so what's next we're concentrating on a

643

00:23:27,029 --> 00:23:24,480

seamless transition to the new

644

00:23:29,990 --> 00:23:27,039

organization and future analysis of

645

00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:30,000

complicated issues of uap issues will

646

00:23:33,590 --> 00:23:31,520

greatly benefit from the infrastructure

647

00:23:35,190 --> 00:23:33,600

of the process and the procedures that

648

00:23:36,789 --> 00:23:35,200

we've developed to date i'm confident

649

00:23:38,390 --> 00:23:36,799

that the task force under navy

650

00:23:40,390 --> 00:23:38,400

leadership has forged a path forward

651
00:23:41,669 --> 00:23:40,400
that will allow us to anchor assessments

652
00:23:43,830 --> 00:23:41,679
in science and engineering vice

653
00:23:48,070 --> 00:23:43,840
anecdotal evidence we remain committed

654
00:23:50,470 --> 00:23:48,080
to that goal as i know the usdi

655
00:23:51,909 --> 00:23:50,480
organization does as well so thank you

656
00:23:53,430 --> 00:23:51,919
very much for your interest in

657
00:23:55,110 --> 00:23:53,440
continuing support for the uap task

658
00:23:56,710 --> 00:23:55,120
force the team's made a lot of progress

659
00:23:57,750 --> 00:23:56,720
but we really are just establishing the

660
00:23:59,269 --> 00:23:57,760
foundation

661
00:24:00,710 --> 00:23:59,279
for the more detailed analysis that's

662
00:24:02,710 --> 00:24:00,720
yet to be done and with your continued

663
00:24:04,549 --> 00:24:02,720

support we can sustain that momentum

664

00:24:06,310 --> 00:24:04,559

necessary to produce data-centric

665

00:24:07,350 --> 00:24:06,320

analysis and understanding the phenomena

666

00:24:09,510 --> 00:24:07,360

i look forward to your questions thank

667

00:24:11,669 --> 00:24:09,520

you thank you mr bray

668

00:24:13,590 --> 00:24:11,679

this is the third version of this task

669

00:24:16,149 --> 00:24:13,600

force and to be frank

670

00:24:18,390 --> 00:24:16,159

one of congress's concerns is

671

00:24:21,510 --> 00:24:18,400

that the executive branch

672

00:24:24,549 --> 00:24:21,520

in administration from both parties

673

00:24:27,269 --> 00:24:24,559

has been sweeping concerns about uaps

674

00:24:28,710 --> 00:24:27,279

under the rug by focusing on events

675

00:24:30,950 --> 00:24:28,720

that can be explained and avoiding

676
00:24:32,070 --> 00:24:30,960
events that cannot be explained

677
00:24:37,110 --> 00:24:32,080
what can you

678
00:24:40,149 --> 00:24:37,120
the american people

679
00:24:41,750 --> 00:24:40,159
confidence that you aren't just focusing

680
00:24:43,430 --> 00:24:41,760
our attention on

681
00:24:47,830 --> 00:24:43,440
low-hanging fruit with

682
00:24:53,990 --> 00:24:51,110
congressman i'll start and then mr bray

683
00:24:54,870 --> 00:24:54,000
please feel free to uh to weigh in

684
00:24:56,710 --> 00:24:54,880
so

685
00:24:59,029 --> 00:24:56,720
the way that we're approaching is is

686
00:25:01,269 --> 00:24:59,039
with a more

687
00:25:02,549 --> 00:25:01,279
thorough standardized methodology and

688
00:25:03,990 --> 00:25:02,559

what we have in the past first and

689

00:25:06,950 --> 00:25:04,000

foremost the secretary of defense is

690

00:25:08,549 --> 00:25:06,960

chartering this effort this is not uh

691

00:25:11,430 --> 00:25:08,559

someone lower in the department of

692

00:25:13,269 --> 00:25:11,440

defense and he has assigned that task to

693

00:25:15,190 --> 00:25:13,279

the office of secretary of defense uh

694

00:25:17,350 --> 00:25:15,200

the under secretary for intelligence

695

00:25:18,950 --> 00:25:17,360

security that's me because i'm

696

00:25:20,710 --> 00:25:18,960

responsible for looking at intelligence

697

00:25:22,789 --> 00:25:20,720

matters i'm responsible for security

698

00:25:25,190 --> 00:25:22,799

matters this is potentially both

699

00:25:27,269 --> 00:25:25,200

so when you start

700

00:25:28,789 --> 00:25:27,279

concerning the

701
00:25:30,630 --> 00:25:28,799
ourselves with the safety of our

702
00:25:32,710 --> 00:25:30,640
personnel the safety of our

703
00:25:34,630 --> 00:25:32,720
installations and bases there's no other

704
00:25:36,950 --> 00:25:34,640
higher priority than what we have than

705
00:25:38,230 --> 00:25:36,960
actually getting after this and as you

706
00:25:41,750 --> 00:25:38,240
have stated

707
00:25:43,909 --> 00:25:41,760
we have been assigned that task to

708
00:25:45,590 --> 00:25:43,919
actually stand up in office the aim song

709
00:25:46,870 --> 00:25:45,600
which i believe the name sermon will

710
00:25:48,789 --> 00:25:46,880
likely change

711
00:25:52,070 --> 00:25:48,799
but we have moved forward in terms of

712
00:25:54,870 --> 00:25:52,080
moving to establish that office we have

713
00:25:57,350 --> 00:25:54,880

as of this week

714

00:25:59,750 --> 00:25:57,360

pick the director for that effort uh a

715

00:26:02,149 --> 00:25:59,760

very established and um

716

00:26:05,269 --> 00:26:02,159

and uh accomplished individual we've

717

00:26:07,750 --> 00:26:05,279

identified spaces we've uh worked with

718

00:26:09,510 --> 00:26:07,760

personnel across the department of

719

00:26:11,909 --> 00:26:09,520

defense with the services and we've

720

00:26:13,510 --> 00:26:11,919

worked with the ic which is on board in

721

00:26:16,789 --> 00:26:13,520

helping us work through this

722

00:26:19,830 --> 00:26:16,799

standardized methodology for now

723

00:26:22,310 --> 00:26:19,840

bringing in data analyzing that data and

724

00:26:24,070 --> 00:26:22,320

reporting that data in the appropriate

725

00:26:25,430 --> 00:26:24,080

method and appropriate means so we can

726

00:26:27,909 --> 00:26:25,440

either get it

727

00:26:30,310 --> 00:26:27,919

to our service personnel to ensure their

728

00:26:31,909 --> 00:26:30,320

safety or get it to you and the congress

729

00:26:33,750 --> 00:26:31,919

and to the public to ensure that you

730

00:26:35,590 --> 00:26:33,760

have oversight to what we're doing so

731

00:26:38,549 --> 00:26:35,600

chartered by the secretary of defense

732

00:26:40,230 --> 00:26:38,559

standardize and a

733

00:26:41,430 --> 00:26:40,240

really a methodical approach is

734

00:26:43,510 --> 00:26:41,440

something we're doing that has not been

735

00:26:45,350 --> 00:26:43,520

done before can we get some kinds of

736

00:26:47,750 --> 00:26:45,360

assurances that your analysts will

737

00:26:50,789 --> 00:26:47,760

follow the facts where they lead and

738

00:26:52,789 --> 00:26:50,799

assess all hypotheses absolutely so

739

00:26:53,590 --> 00:26:52,799

we're open to all hypotheses we're open

740

00:26:56,310 --> 00:26:53,600

to

741

00:26:57,830 --> 00:26:56,320

any uh conclusions that uh that we may

742

00:26:59,269 --> 00:26:57,840

encounter

743

00:27:01,510 --> 00:26:59,279

uh quickly before i pass it to the

744

00:27:02,390 --> 00:27:01,520

ranking member uh and and chairman

745

00:27:03,830 --> 00:27:02,400

schiff

746

00:27:05,430 --> 00:27:03,840

i want to thank you both for taking the

747

00:27:07,590 --> 00:27:05,440

time and i had a good time meeting with

748

00:27:08,630 --> 00:27:07,600

you last week uh director moultrie under

749

00:27:09,669 --> 00:27:08,640

secretary

750

00:27:12,149 --> 00:27:09,679

moultrie

751
00:27:16,549 --> 00:27:14,470
it's fair to say that you are a science

752
00:27:18,789 --> 00:27:16,559
fiction fan is that correct

753
00:27:22,070 --> 00:27:18,799
it's fair to say that uh i am an

754
00:27:23,830 --> 00:27:22,080
inquisitive mind who has uh spent 40

755
00:27:25,669 --> 00:27:23,840
years in the intelligence field and has

756
00:27:27,350 --> 00:27:25,679
focused on both science and science

757
00:27:29,909 --> 00:27:27,360
fiction that is fair could you tell us

758
00:27:32,070 --> 00:27:29,919
about it yeah well yeah look my

759
00:27:33,750 --> 00:27:32,080
generation grew up

760
00:27:35,909 --> 00:27:33,760
looking at

761
00:27:39,110 --> 00:27:35,919
space sagas and and

762
00:27:41,830 --> 00:27:39,120
the apollo program so all of us who uh

763
00:27:44,230 --> 00:27:41,840

grew up in the 60s uh were were just

764

00:27:45,909 --> 00:27:44,240

thrilled by watching

765

00:27:48,310 --> 00:27:45,919

our first astronaut land on the moon

766

00:27:49,190 --> 00:27:48,320

that was a momentous occasion to people

767

00:27:51,510 --> 00:27:49,200

who

768

00:27:53,110 --> 00:27:51,520

were of different generations uh some of

769

00:27:54,789 --> 00:27:53,120

them didn't believe that happened i

770

00:27:56,230 --> 00:27:54,799

still have relatives and friends who

771

00:27:58,310 --> 00:27:56,240

don't believe it happened right science

772

00:28:00,230 --> 00:27:58,320

fiction to them but to us it was no

773

00:28:01,190 --> 00:28:00,240

that's the progress that we've made

774

00:28:03,350 --> 00:28:01,200

and so

775

00:28:06,470 --> 00:28:03,360

i was enthralled by that and i've taken

776

00:28:09,350 --> 00:28:06,480

that to heart i enjoy um

777

00:28:11,590 --> 00:28:09,360

the challenge of what may be out there i

778

00:28:13,430 --> 00:28:11,600

have mentioned to you that yes i have

779

00:28:14,870 --> 00:28:13,440

followed science fiction i have gone to

780

00:28:18,549 --> 00:28:14,880

conventions even i'll say it on the

781

00:28:20,549 --> 00:28:18,559

record uh uh gotta break the ice somehow

782

00:28:22,630 --> 00:28:20,559

but uh you know i have done that right

783

00:28:25,350 --> 00:28:22,640

but there's nothing wrong with that um

784

00:28:26,870 --> 00:28:25,360

don't necessarily dress up but i do uh

785

00:28:28,789 --> 00:28:26,880

you know i do believe that it's

786

00:28:30,549 --> 00:28:28,799

important to show that the department of

787

00:28:32,389 --> 00:28:30,559

defense has um you know we have

788

00:28:34,549 --> 00:28:32,399

character and we're people just like you

789

00:28:37,590 --> 00:28:34,559

just like the american people we have

790

00:28:39,669 --> 00:28:37,600

our um we have our uh

791

00:28:41,510 --> 00:28:39,679

our inquisitiveness uh we have our

792

00:28:43,029 --> 00:28:41,520

questions we want to know what's out

793

00:28:44,950 --> 00:28:43,039

there as much as you want to know what's

794

00:28:46,470 --> 00:28:44,960

out there we get the questions not just

795

00:28:48,470 --> 00:28:46,480

from you we get it from family members

796

00:28:50,230 --> 00:28:48,480

and we get them night and day

797

00:28:51,909 --> 00:28:50,240

not just in committee hearings so

798

00:28:53,669 --> 00:28:51,919

finding what's out there is important

799

00:28:55,669 --> 00:28:53,679

but first and fore and foremost it's

800

00:28:58,070 --> 00:28:55,679

important for us to do that so we can

801
00:29:00,389 --> 00:28:58,080
ensure that our people our personnel our

802
00:29:01,750 --> 00:29:00,399
aviators our bases and installations are

803
00:29:03,590 --> 00:29:01,760
safe

804
00:29:05,510 --> 00:29:03,600
and then that curiosity factor is

805
00:29:07,669 --> 00:29:05,520
something else that that we just want to

806
00:29:09,590 --> 00:29:07,679
know because that's the human race it's

807
00:29:12,070 --> 00:29:09,600
just you know that insatiable desire to

808
00:29:15,029 --> 00:29:12,080
know

809
00:29:17,430 --> 00:29:15,039
thank you sir thank you member crawford

810
00:29:20,710 --> 00:29:17,440
mr melter you said you don't necessarily

811
00:29:25,669 --> 00:29:23,360
that wasn't a real strong statement

812
00:29:27,269 --> 00:29:25,679
[Laughter]

813
00:29:29,350 --> 00:29:27,279

gentlemen thank you for being here today

814

00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:29,360

we appreciate it um

815

00:29:33,110 --> 00:29:30,960

and thank you mr mulder for breaking the

816

00:29:35,110 --> 00:29:33,120

ice the way you did appreciate that the

817

00:29:36,470 --> 00:29:35,120

inability to understand objects in our

818

00:29:38,070 --> 00:29:36,480

sensitive

819

00:29:39,909 --> 00:29:38,080

operating areas is tantamount to an

820

00:29:41,909 --> 00:29:39,919

intelligence failure that we certainly

821

00:29:43,830 --> 00:29:41,919

want to avoid this is not about finding

822

00:29:45,269 --> 00:29:43,840

alien spacecraft but about delivering

823

00:29:46,870 --> 00:29:45,279

dominant intelligence across the

824

00:29:48,230 --> 00:29:46,880

tactical operational and strategic

825

00:29:50,470 --> 00:29:48,240

spectrum

826

00:29:54,789 --> 00:29:50,480

so my question is how can amesog lead to

827

00:29:59,669 --> 00:29:57,350

sure i'll start with that uh so the goal

828

00:30:01,669 --> 00:29:59,679

of our effort is to integrate it into

829

00:30:04,630 --> 00:30:01,679

what we already do on a normal basis

830

00:30:05,909 --> 00:30:04,640

which is look for the unknown unknowns

831

00:30:08,149 --> 00:30:05,919

congressman as you stated in your

832

00:30:09,590 --> 00:30:08,159

opening remarks across all domains so

833

00:30:11,990 --> 00:30:09,600

we've been doing this for decades we've

834

00:30:13,909 --> 00:30:12,000

been looking at the space domain looking

835

00:30:16,149 --> 00:30:13,919

at space objects looking at space

836

00:30:17,990 --> 00:30:16,159

weather looking at space phenomena

837

00:30:20,549 --> 00:30:18,000

we've been looking at things in the air

838

00:30:22,149 --> 00:30:20,559

domain and we as you know we and i'll

839

00:30:24,149 --> 00:30:22,159

talk more about this and classified

840

00:30:26,710 --> 00:30:24,159

session but we have a very concerted

841

00:30:28,789 --> 00:30:26,720

effort to understand adversarial

842

00:30:30,549 --> 00:30:28,799

platforms and adversarial developmental

843

00:30:31,750 --> 00:30:30,559

programs and we do that also in the

844

00:30:34,230 --> 00:30:31,760

ground domain and of course we're very

845

00:30:36,470 --> 00:30:34,240

interested in what happens in the uh

846

00:30:39,190 --> 00:30:36,480

in the underwater or c domain if you

847

00:30:41,310 --> 00:30:39,200

will subsurface domain so if there are

848

00:30:44,549 --> 00:30:41,320

objects that our

849

00:30:49,510 --> 00:30:44,559

aviators or air crews are encountering

850

00:30:51,510 --> 00:30:49,520

in this air domain and their sensors are

851

00:30:53,669 --> 00:30:51,520

are discovering or detecting some of

852

00:30:56,230 --> 00:30:53,679

these objects we want to just bring that

853

00:30:58,230 --> 00:30:56,240

in to the normal process that we have

854

00:30:59,669 --> 00:30:58,240

for identifying unknown unknowns we want

855

00:31:01,830 --> 00:30:59,679

to make sure we have the intelligence

856

00:31:04,070 --> 00:31:01,840

requirements that allow us not only to

857

00:31:06,950 --> 00:31:04,080

look at that event from the time that it

858

00:31:08,630 --> 00:31:06,960

occurs forward but maybe retrospectively

859

00:31:10,389 --> 00:31:08,640

we want to go back and see if we can get

860

00:31:12,310 --> 00:31:10,399

to the left of that event to say was

861

00:31:14,070 --> 00:31:12,320

there some developmental program

862

00:31:15,269 --> 00:31:14,080

that we to get to your technical

863

00:31:16,950 --> 00:31:15,279

surprise

864

00:31:19,669 --> 00:31:16,960

issue sir that we should have known

865

00:31:21,110 --> 00:31:19,679

about and if so how do we put that

866

00:31:23,990 --> 00:31:21,120

intelligence requirement in place to

867

00:31:25,990 --> 00:31:24,000

ensure that we are following an

868

00:31:27,830 --> 00:31:26,000

adversarial development or any other

869

00:31:29,750 --> 00:31:27,840

development that may be out there so

870

00:31:31,350 --> 00:31:29,760

that's what we we want to do in terms of

871

00:31:33,350 --> 00:31:31,360

normalizing this and bringing it into

872

00:31:34,789 --> 00:31:33,360

the normal process of how we identify

873

00:31:36,630 --> 00:31:34,799

unknown unknowns

874

00:31:37,990 --> 00:31:36,640

so you mentioned fidelity and i think

875

00:31:40,549 --> 00:31:38,000

it's important to

876

00:31:43,830 --> 00:31:40,559

talk about the relationship

877

00:31:47,350 --> 00:31:43,840

from the navy is the lead agency on this

878

00:31:49,590 --> 00:31:47,360

how do you interact with space force air

879

00:31:51,110 --> 00:31:49,600

force to create that degree of fidelity

880

00:31:52,230 --> 00:31:51,120

we're talking about sensors and so on

881

00:31:53,830 --> 00:31:52,240

and i guess

882

00:31:55,509 --> 00:31:53,840

where i have some concerns that many of

883

00:31:57,830 --> 00:31:55,519

the images that we see

884

00:31:59,350 --> 00:31:57,840

commonly

885

00:32:02,070 --> 00:31:59,360

in this committee and even in open

886

00:32:04,310 --> 00:32:02,080

source the resolution and the clarity

887

00:32:06,310 --> 00:32:04,320

that would allow a robust technical

888

00:32:07,350 --> 00:32:06,320

intelligence analysis is

889

00:32:09,269 --> 00:32:07,360

challenging

890

00:32:11,029 --> 00:32:09,279

so is aimshot

891

00:32:13,190 --> 00:32:11,039

prepared to address the quality and

892

00:32:14,789 --> 00:32:13,200

quantity of data collected on uap to

893

00:32:16,870 --> 00:32:14,799

advance intelligence collection and do

894

00:32:19,350 --> 00:32:16,880

you have the adequate sensors you need

895

00:32:21,110 --> 00:32:19,360

to collect that high quality data

896

00:32:23,110 --> 00:32:21,120

one of the lines of effort that we have

897

00:32:25,909 --> 00:32:23,120

is looking at our sensor capabilities

898

00:32:28,630 --> 00:32:25,919

and to understand whether or not

899

00:32:30,149 --> 00:32:28,640

the video showed that mr bray

900

00:32:32,230 --> 00:32:30,159

displayed

901
00:32:33,750 --> 00:32:32,240
sometimes it's very fleeting

902
00:32:35,830 --> 00:32:33,760
data that we have on some of these

903
00:32:37,190 --> 00:32:35,840
objects and and we want to make sure

904
00:32:39,110 --> 00:32:37,200
that one

905
00:32:41,190 --> 00:32:39,120
our systems are calibrated

906
00:32:42,950 --> 00:32:41,200
to actually be able to collect on the

907
00:32:45,269 --> 00:32:42,960
objects you know our sensors today are

908
00:32:47,269 --> 00:32:45,279
they're calibrated for specific things

909
00:32:48,789 --> 00:32:47,279
we want to make sure to calibrate it for

910
00:32:51,110 --> 00:32:48,799
things of this nature things of this

911
00:32:53,430 --> 00:32:51,120
size things of this velocity if i can

912
00:32:55,669 --> 00:32:53,440
use that term we want to make sure that

913
00:32:58,389 --> 00:32:55,679

once we have that that that data is

914

00:33:00,389 --> 00:32:58,399

stored in some standardized method that

915

00:33:02,310 --> 00:33:00,399

we can then extract and that we can feed

916

00:33:04,710 --> 00:33:02,320

into our system real time so we do not

917

00:33:06,149 --> 00:33:04,720

like want this to take some uh prolonged

918

00:33:09,269 --> 00:33:06,159

period of time for us to get that data

919

00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:09,279

but our goal is absolutely to have that

920

00:33:12,710 --> 00:33:11,200

high fidelity information that we get

921

00:33:14,789 --> 00:33:12,720

from all sensors and we want to be able

922

00:33:16,710 --> 00:33:14,799

to integrate that with what we may have

923

00:33:17,990 --> 00:33:16,720

off a ground-based sensor so whatever

924

00:33:19,750 --> 00:33:18,000

you may have on a platform whatever we

925

00:33:20,549 --> 00:33:19,760

may have on the ground whatever we may

926
00:33:21,590 --> 00:33:20,559
have

927
00:33:23,430 --> 00:33:21,600
from

928
00:33:24,789 --> 00:33:23,440
other sensors that we may have in

929
00:33:25,990 --> 00:33:24,799
different domains we want to be able to

930
00:33:28,149 --> 00:33:26,000
integrate that all and get this

931
00:33:30,070 --> 00:33:28,159
integrated picture as we would as i said

932
00:33:31,590 --> 00:33:30,080
with any other unidentified objects or

933
00:33:33,110 --> 00:33:31,600
things that we are tracking

934
00:33:34,789 --> 00:33:33,120
as a part of our normal intelligence

935
00:33:36,389 --> 00:33:34,799
responsibilities

936
00:33:39,750 --> 00:33:36,399
thank you last question mr bray if you

937
00:33:41,669 --> 00:33:39,760
would uh i'm a navy pilot i've

938
00:33:43,269 --> 00:33:41,679

encountered a uap walk me through the

939

00:33:45,590 --> 00:33:43,279

reporting protocol

940

00:33:47,269 --> 00:33:45,600

um once i see something that i think

941

00:33:48,230 --> 00:33:47,279

needs reported

942

00:33:50,389 --> 00:33:48,240

uh

943

00:33:52,310 --> 00:33:50,399

the first thing that aviator would do

944

00:33:54,310 --> 00:33:52,320

after landing as a part of their normal

945

00:33:56,549 --> 00:33:54,320

uh debriefing is they would uh

946

00:33:58,310 --> 00:33:56,559

contact their uh intelligence officer

947

00:34:00,870 --> 00:33:58,320

their intelligence officer would then uh

948

00:34:03,269 --> 00:34:00,880

walk them through uh first filing a

949

00:34:06,310 --> 00:34:03,279

first actually data preservation doing

950

00:34:08,149 --> 00:34:06,320

to ensure that that whatever sensor data

951
00:34:10,230 --> 00:34:08,159
may be on the aircraft that we preserve

952
00:34:12,710 --> 00:34:10,240
that so that it's available for for

953
00:34:15,909 --> 00:34:12,720
later analysis um second they would

954
00:34:17,510 --> 00:34:15,919
actually fill out a a form uh that that

955
00:34:19,270 --> 00:34:17,520
includes details like where they were

956
00:34:21,589 --> 00:34:19,280
operating altitudes their operating

957
00:34:23,750 --> 00:34:21,599
speeds what they observed

958
00:34:25,510 --> 00:34:23,760
whatever sense of data sensor data they

959
00:34:28,389 --> 00:34:25,520
may have recorded from that

960
00:34:30,869 --> 00:34:28,399
and then that report is filed it goes

961
00:34:32,869 --> 00:34:30,879
two places one it goes through

962
00:34:34,629 --> 00:34:32,879
through the operational

963
00:34:36,710 --> 00:34:34,639

chain of command so that operational

964

00:34:38,790 --> 00:34:36,720

units are aware of what uh what's being

965

00:34:41,430 --> 00:34:38,800

observed and also

966

00:34:44,869 --> 00:34:41,440

to the uap task force so that they can

967

00:34:47,589 --> 00:34:44,879

take that data uh database it and

968

00:34:50,790 --> 00:34:47,599

quite often uh have individuals from the

969

00:34:52,149 --> 00:34:50,800

task force uh contact the aviator uh and

970

00:34:54,149 --> 00:34:52,159

ask them additional questions if there

971

00:34:56,629 --> 00:34:54,159

were things that weren't clear uh in the

972

00:34:59,510 --> 00:34:56,639

uh in the report uh that thing goes into

973

00:35:02,069 --> 00:34:59,520

a um uh into a database uh where we

974

00:35:03,670 --> 00:35:02,079

begin to compare it with other

975

00:35:06,230 --> 00:35:03,680

observations that we have again

976
00:35:09,270 --> 00:35:06,240
comparing for locations comparing for

977
00:35:11,190 --> 00:35:09,280
altitude speeds shapes

978
00:35:12,470 --> 00:35:11,200
if any rf emissions were detected from

979
00:35:14,310 --> 00:35:12,480
the platform

980
00:35:16,310 --> 00:35:14,320
all of that so that we can try to reach

981
00:35:17,990 --> 00:35:16,320
some conclusions on that thank you

982
00:35:20,069 --> 00:35:18,000
you're back

983
00:35:22,150 --> 00:35:20,079
gentleman yields back chairmanship

984
00:35:24,790 --> 00:35:22,160
thanks chairman um mr break can you

985
00:35:27,349 --> 00:35:24,800
rerun that first image that looked like

986
00:35:29,190 --> 00:35:27,359
it was outside of a plane window

987
00:35:31,190 --> 00:35:29,200
and if you wouldn't mind going up to the

988
00:35:33,349 --> 00:35:31,200

screen and tell us what we're

989

00:35:34,790 --> 00:35:33,359

what we're seeing

990

00:35:36,550 --> 00:35:34,800

not that you can necessarily tell us

991

00:35:38,310 --> 00:35:36,560

what we're seeing but right explain what

992

00:35:41,109 --> 00:35:38,320

we should be looking at in that first

993

00:35:44,069 --> 00:35:41,119

image absolutely uh and alexi what i'll

994

00:36:14,150 --> 00:35:44,079

ask is if you can stop it at a certain

995

00:36:18,069 --> 00:36:16,470

and are we looking outside of a civilian

996

00:36:21,829 --> 00:36:18,079

aircraft window is that what we're

997

00:36:21,839 --> 00:36:30,310

okay

998

00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:49,990

is

999

00:36:50,000 --> 00:37:04,150

yes

1000

00:37:04,160 --> 00:37:08,310

as you can see

1001
00:37:12,310 --> 00:37:10,470
um what you'll find uh eventually on

1002
00:37:15,829 --> 00:37:12,320
this when we find the right frame is for

1003
00:37:18,230 --> 00:37:15,839
literally about one frame here is a

1004
00:37:20,790 --> 00:37:18,240
spherical object

1005
00:37:33,829 --> 00:37:20,800
that passes uh right through here

1006
00:38:16,790 --> 00:37:35,349
can you point to the screen again what

1007
00:38:36,310 --> 00:38:19,430
okay if you could stop that frame

1008
00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:42,870
alexa just push play let's see

1009
00:38:46,710 --> 00:38:44,470
here's what you'll see coming up right

1010
00:38:49,190 --> 00:38:46,720
here is that there went now back up just

1011
00:38:53,349 --> 00:38:51,750
spherical object right here zooms by the

1012
00:38:59,109 --> 00:38:53,359
window uh

1013
00:39:02,870 --> 00:39:01,349

there we go

1014

00:39:04,069 --> 00:39:02,880

did you see that part right there again

1015

00:39:07,750 --> 00:39:04,079

going by i think we're having a hard

1016

00:39:07,760 --> 00:39:16,470

all right

1017

00:39:16,480 --> 00:39:23,030

okay so as you can see it's difficult

1018

00:39:27,030 --> 00:39:25,430

um the laptop we're working with uh is

1019

00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:27,040

not as easy for us stopping that video

1020

00:39:31,589 --> 00:39:28,800

in the right spot we'll describe what

1021

00:39:34,950 --> 00:39:31,599

what we have seen in that uh what are we

1022

00:39:35,750 --> 00:39:34,960

observing uh what you see here uh is um

1023

00:39:46,230 --> 00:39:35,760

uh

1024

00:39:47,670 --> 00:39:46,240

observed a spherical object

1025

00:39:49,589 --> 00:39:47,680

in that area

1026
00:39:51,670 --> 00:39:49,599
and as they fly by it they take a video

1027
00:39:53,829 --> 00:39:51,680
you see a

1028
00:39:55,349 --> 00:39:53,839
it looks uh reflective in this video

1029
00:39:57,670 --> 00:39:55,359
somewhat reflective

1030
00:40:00,710 --> 00:39:57,680
and it quickly passes by

1031
00:40:02,950 --> 00:40:00,720
uh the cockpit of the uh of the aircraft

1032
00:40:04,710 --> 00:40:02,960
and is this one of the phenomena that we

1033
00:40:07,270 --> 00:40:04,720
can't explain i do not have an

1034
00:40:09,190 --> 00:40:07,280
explanation for what this

1035
00:40:11,190 --> 00:40:09,200
this specific uh

1036
00:40:13,589 --> 00:40:11,200
object is and is this one of the

1037
00:40:14,870 --> 00:40:13,599
situations where it is

1038
00:40:17,030 --> 00:40:14,880

that's that's the object that we're

1039

00:40:18,150 --> 00:40:17,040

looking at right there thank you

1040

00:40:20,550 --> 00:40:18,160

um

1041

00:40:22,309 --> 00:40:20,560

and is this a situation where

1042

00:40:24,230 --> 00:40:22,319

it was observed by the pilot and it was

1043

00:40:25,910 --> 00:40:24,240

also recorded by the aircraft's

1044

00:40:28,150 --> 00:40:25,920

instruments

1045

00:40:33,349 --> 00:40:28,160

we'll talk about the multi-sensor part

1046

00:40:36,829 --> 00:40:35,270

but in this case

1047

00:40:39,670 --> 00:40:36,839

we have at least

1048

00:40:41,589 --> 00:40:39,680

that um in in the

1049

00:40:44,309 --> 00:40:41,599

director of national intelligence uh

1050

00:40:48,230 --> 00:40:44,319

2021 unclassified report

1051
00:40:52,309 --> 00:40:48,240
um the odni reported 144

1052
00:40:55,270 --> 00:40:52,319
uaps between 2004 and 2021

1053
00:40:56,950 --> 00:40:55,280
uh 80 of which were uh recorded on

1054
00:40:57,990 --> 00:40:56,960
multiple instruments

1055
00:40:59,910 --> 00:40:58,000
um

1056
00:41:01,030 --> 00:40:59,920
and i take it with respect to some of

1057
00:41:03,349 --> 00:41:01,040
those

1058
00:41:05,750 --> 00:41:03,359
you had the pilot a pilot seeing them it

1059
00:41:07,670 --> 00:41:05,760
was observed by a pilot and you had

1060
00:41:09,270 --> 00:41:07,680
multiple instruments recording it so you

1061
00:41:11,190 --> 00:41:09,280
really have three sensors the human

1062
00:41:12,870 --> 00:41:11,200
sensor and two

1063
00:41:14,950 --> 00:41:12,880

technical uh

1064

00:41:18,630 --> 00:41:14,960

sensors detecting the object is that for

1065

00:41:20,950 --> 00:41:18,640

them for the majority of uh

1066

00:41:23,589 --> 00:41:20,960

incidents that we had in the uh

1067

00:41:26,710 --> 00:41:23,599

last year's report uh the majority had

1068

00:41:28,950 --> 00:41:26,720

multi-sensor data uh when i talk about

1069

00:41:30,230 --> 00:41:28,960

the 400 reports that we have now

1070

00:41:31,990 --> 00:41:30,240

that number will certainly go down

1071

00:41:33,510 --> 00:41:32,000

because a lot of those

1072

00:41:35,270 --> 00:41:33,520

new reports that we have are actually

1073

00:41:37,990 --> 00:41:35,280

historic reports that are narrative

1074

00:41:40,870 --> 00:41:38,000

based so that percentage will go down

1075

00:41:42,710 --> 00:41:40,880

just as a factor of uh the fact that the

1076

00:41:44,470 --> 00:41:42,720

that the destigmatization has resulted

1077

00:41:45,910 --> 00:41:44,480

in more narrative reports and that's the

1078

00:41:51,510 --> 00:41:45,920

object we're looking at right there now

1079

00:41:57,750 --> 00:41:53,829

last year's report also said that of

1080

00:41:59,910 --> 00:41:57,760

those 144 18 of them

1081

00:42:00,829 --> 00:41:59,920

reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual

1082

00:42:02,790 --> 00:42:00,839

flight

1083

00:42:05,510 --> 00:42:02,800

characteristics appear to demonstrate

1084

00:42:06,630 --> 00:42:05,520

advanced technology

1085

00:42:08,710 --> 00:42:06,640

and

1086

00:42:10,870 --> 00:42:08,720

some of them appear to remain stationary

1087

00:42:12,470 --> 00:42:10,880

in winds aloft move against the wind

1088

00:42:14,230 --> 00:42:12,480

maneuver abruptly or move at

1089

00:42:17,430 --> 00:42:14,240

considerable speed without discernible

1090

00:42:21,990 --> 00:42:17,440

means of propulsion

1091

00:42:25,430 --> 00:42:23,910

and if you're able to answer this in

1092

00:42:29,270 --> 00:42:25,440

this setting

1093

00:42:32,309 --> 00:42:29,280

are we aware of any uh foreign adversary

1094

00:42:33,910 --> 00:42:32,319

capable of moving objects

1095

00:42:35,829 --> 00:42:33,920

without any discernible means of

1096

00:42:37,589 --> 00:42:35,839

propulsion

1097

00:42:39,670 --> 00:42:37,599

um

1098

00:42:41,990 --> 00:42:39,680

i think i would without discernible

1099

00:42:44,069 --> 00:42:42,000

means of propulsion i would say that

1100

00:42:45,829 --> 00:42:44,079

we're not aware of any adversary that

1101
00:42:47,750 --> 00:42:45,839
can move an object without discernible

1102
00:42:49,750 --> 00:42:47,760
means of propulsion

1103
00:42:51,270 --> 00:42:49,760
the question then becomes in many of

1104
00:42:53,510 --> 00:42:51,280
these cases where we don't have a

1105
00:42:55,349 --> 00:42:53,520
discernible mean of propulsion in the

1106
00:42:57,190 --> 00:42:55,359
data that we have

1107
00:43:00,390 --> 00:42:57,200
in some cases

1108
00:43:01,349 --> 00:43:00,400
um there is likely sensor artifacts uh

1109
00:43:06,309 --> 00:43:01,359
that

1110
00:43:07,990 --> 00:43:06,319
there's certainly some degree of uh of

1111
00:43:09,910 --> 00:43:08,000
something that looks like signature

1112
00:43:11,829 --> 00:43:09,920
management that we have seen from some

1113
00:43:13,510 --> 00:43:11,839

of these uh

1114

00:43:15,990 --> 00:43:13,520

uap

1115

00:43:18,309 --> 00:43:16,000

but i would i would caution i would

1116

00:43:20,470 --> 00:43:18,319

simply say that there are a number of uh

1117

00:43:22,309 --> 00:43:20,480

of events in which we do not have an

1118

00:43:24,630 --> 00:43:22,319

explanation in which then there are a

1119

00:43:26,710 --> 00:43:24,640

small handful in which there are flight

1120

00:43:29,589 --> 00:43:26,720

characteristics or signature management

1121

00:43:30,630 --> 00:43:29,599

um that we can't explain with the data

1122

00:43:32,390 --> 00:43:30,640

that we have

1123

00:43:34,790 --> 00:43:32,400

um we'll continue those are obviously

1124

00:43:36,710 --> 00:43:34,800

the ones that are of most interest to us

1125

00:43:39,030 --> 00:43:36,720

earlier when we asked about how you

1126
00:43:40,790 --> 00:43:39,040
avoid technological surprise the biggest

1127
00:43:42,790 --> 00:43:40,800
way you avoid technological surprises by

1128
00:43:44,230 --> 00:43:42,800
collecting this type of data and by

1129
00:43:46,069 --> 00:43:44,240
importantly

1130
00:43:48,870 --> 00:43:46,079
calibrating the assumptions that you go

1131
00:43:50,470 --> 00:43:48,880
into with how you do that analysis i'll

1132
00:43:51,430 --> 00:43:50,480
tell you within the uap task force we

1133
00:43:54,150 --> 00:43:51,440
have

1134
00:43:56,390 --> 00:43:54,160
one basic assumption and that is that

1135
00:43:59,430 --> 00:43:56,400
generally speaking generally speaking

1136
00:44:01,270 --> 00:43:59,440
our sensors operate as designed

1137
00:44:03,829 --> 00:44:01,280
and we make that assumption because many

1138
00:44:06,150 --> 00:44:03,839

times these are multi-sensor collections

1139

00:44:08,230 --> 00:44:06,160

we make no assumptions about the origin

1140

00:44:09,910 --> 00:44:08,240

of this or that there may or may not be

1141

00:44:11,910 --> 00:44:09,920

some sort of technology that we don't

1142

00:44:13,750 --> 00:44:11,920

understand that's i think the key to

1143

00:44:15,670 --> 00:44:13,760

avoiding technological surprises by

1144

00:44:18,230 --> 00:44:15,680

calibrating those assumptions

1145

00:44:20,870 --> 00:44:18,240

and finally um with respect to the

1146

00:44:23,430 --> 00:44:20,880

second two videos uh showing the

1147

00:44:26,550 --> 00:44:23,440

small triangles

1148

00:44:27,349 --> 00:44:26,560

the hypothesis is that those are

1149

00:44:31,829 --> 00:44:27,359

uh

1150

00:44:33,510 --> 00:44:31,839

use of night vision goggles appear like

1151

00:44:35,910 --> 00:44:33,520

triangles is that the

1152

00:44:38,390 --> 00:44:35,920

operating assessment some type of uh of

1153

00:44:41,109 --> 00:44:38,400

drone uh some type of unmanned aerial

1154

00:44:44,470 --> 00:44:41,119

system uh and it is simply that that

1155

00:44:46,550 --> 00:44:44,480

light source uh resolves itself through

1156

00:44:49,829 --> 00:44:46,560

the um through the night vision goggles

1157

00:44:51,510 --> 00:44:49,839

onto the slr camera as a triangle and

1158

00:44:54,470 --> 00:44:51,520

have we in order to prove that

1159

00:44:56,790 --> 00:44:54,480

hypothesis uh flown

1160

00:44:59,270 --> 00:44:56,800

a drone uh and observed it with that

1161

00:45:01,589 --> 00:44:59,280

same technology to see whether we can

1162

00:45:03,270 --> 00:45:01,599

reproduce the effect the uap task force

1163

00:45:07,109 --> 00:45:03,280

is aware of studies that have done that

1164

00:45:09,589 --> 00:45:07,119

okay thank you mr chairman i yield back

1165

00:45:11,190 --> 00:45:09,599

the gentleman yields back

1166

00:45:13,109 --> 00:45:11,200

dr winstrom

1167

00:45:15,349 --> 00:45:13,119

thank you mr chairman thank you all for

1168

00:45:17,030 --> 00:45:15,359

being here um

1169

00:45:19,030 --> 00:45:17,040

my first question is

1170

00:45:20,630 --> 00:45:19,040

through this process where there's been

1171

00:45:25,910 --> 00:45:20,640

sightings

1172

00:45:28,870 --> 00:45:25,920

have they always been

1173

00:45:31,190 --> 00:45:28,880

cited from a moving object

1174

00:45:32,390 --> 00:45:31,200

from a plane or a ship that may be

1175

00:45:34,309 --> 00:45:32,400

moving

1176

00:45:36,230 --> 00:45:34,319

have these reports ever come from a

1177

00:45:37,670 --> 00:45:36,240

stationary object

1178

00:45:39,190 --> 00:45:37,680

being observed

1179

00:45:41,990 --> 00:45:39,200

in the sky

1180

00:45:44,069 --> 00:45:42,000

the uap task force does have uh reports

1181

00:45:45,990 --> 00:45:44,079

from stationary

1182

00:45:47,990 --> 00:45:46,000

from state reports from a stationary

1183

00:45:49,510 --> 00:45:48,000

observer okay there's a difference in

1184

00:45:51,430 --> 00:45:49,520

observing something when you're moving

1185

00:45:53,109 --> 00:45:51,440

as well it's it's physics right that's

1186

00:45:54,069 --> 00:45:53,119

why i asked that question

1187

00:45:56,230 --> 00:45:54,079

uh

1188

00:45:57,910 --> 00:45:56,240

are we capable or have we made any

1189

00:45:59,910 --> 00:45:57,920

breakthroughs or anyone made any

1190

00:46:00,870 --> 00:45:59,920

breakthroughs to be able to site

1191

00:46:04,309 --> 00:46:00,880

something

1192

00:46:07,190 --> 00:46:04,319

and make some determination at all

1193

00:46:09,109 --> 00:46:07,200

of its composition whether it's a solid

1194

00:46:14,230 --> 00:46:09,119

or a gas

1195

00:46:18,309 --> 00:46:15,910

um

1196

00:46:19,829 --> 00:46:18,319

from not asking what i just right from

1197

00:46:22,550 --> 00:46:19,839

some of the returns i mean it's clear

1198

00:46:24,069 --> 00:46:22,560

that uh that the majority well it's

1199

00:46:26,309 --> 00:46:24,079

clear that many of the observations we

1200

00:46:29,349 --> 00:46:26,319

have are physical objects uh from the

1201

00:46:31,270 --> 00:46:29,359

the sensor data that we have

1202

00:46:33,589 --> 00:46:31,280

well gas is physical as a physical

1203

00:46:35,270 --> 00:46:33,599

object it can be and so

1204

00:46:36,710 --> 00:46:35,280

and you see where i'm going with this

1205

00:46:38,230 --> 00:46:36,720

i'm trying to determine what it is we're

1206

00:46:40,870 --> 00:46:38,240

looking at so if we can decide if

1207

00:46:43,030 --> 00:46:40,880

something is a solid or a gas and and if

1208

00:46:46,309 --> 00:46:43,040

there been any conclusion on its

1209

00:46:49,829 --> 00:46:46,319

capabilities like its capabilities of

1210

00:46:52,790 --> 00:46:49,839

movement uh of turning uh going you know

1211

00:46:54,470 --> 00:46:52,800

180 degrees or 90 degree turn anything

1212

00:46:56,950 --> 00:46:54,480

along that line that we've been able to

1213

00:46:58,630 --> 00:46:56,960

determine um within the and again i

1214

00:47:00,790 --> 00:46:58,640

should point out that uh you know that

1215

00:47:02,630 --> 00:47:00,800

there is not a single explanation for

1216

00:47:04,790 --> 00:47:02,640

uap they are make up there are a lot of

1217

00:47:07,030 --> 00:47:04,800

different things uh that that are

1218

00:47:09,190 --> 00:47:07,040

unidentified phenomena basically

1219

00:47:11,109 --> 00:47:09,200

we really don't know much on that that's

1220

00:47:12,870 --> 00:47:11,119

that's all i'm trying to get we i'm

1221

00:47:15,109 --> 00:47:12,880

pleased that you have protocol right now

1222

00:47:17,670 --> 00:47:15,119

for our military but are there

1223

00:47:19,829 --> 00:47:17,680

any non-military reports coming forward

1224

00:47:21,349 --> 00:47:19,839

of similar events or is it all coming

1225

00:47:22,790 --> 00:47:21,359

from military

1226

00:47:25,270 --> 00:47:22,800

the uap task force has a very good

1227

00:47:26,710 --> 00:47:25,280

working relationship with the faa uh

1228

00:47:29,109 --> 00:47:26,720

they have very good working relationship

1229

00:47:32,390 --> 00:47:29,119

with other parts of the us government so

1230

00:47:35,829 --> 00:47:32,400

that we can ingest reports uh from um

1231

00:47:37,910 --> 00:47:35,839

do we have any reports non-military

1232

00:47:38,790 --> 00:47:37,920

yes thank you that's that's that's my

1233

00:47:41,270 --> 00:47:38,800

question

1234

00:47:43,510 --> 00:47:41,280

um and do we need to put out protocol

1235

00:47:45,430 --> 00:47:43,520

for civilians that may be in that arena

1236

00:47:47,270 --> 00:47:45,440

like through faa do you think that would

1237

00:47:50,069 --> 00:47:47,280

be appropriate and helpful

1238

00:47:53,270 --> 00:47:50,079

i think standardized reporting without a

1239

00:47:56,069 --> 00:47:53,280

doubt is key to helping us get to the to

1240

00:47:59,349 --> 00:47:56,079

ascertain what some of these are i think

1241

00:48:01,990 --> 00:47:59,359

it would be important as well do we um

1242

00:48:04,309 --> 00:48:02,000

there are other people besides uh the

1243

00:48:06,630 --> 00:48:04,319

u.s that have had these experiences and

1244

00:48:09,750 --> 00:48:06,640

reported them is that correct

1245

00:48:10,710 --> 00:48:09,760

there are that's correct uh is it uh all

1246

00:48:13,589 --> 00:48:10,720

of our

1247

00:48:15,750 --> 00:48:13,599

allies or is it allies and adversaries

1248

00:48:17,589 --> 00:48:15,760

what have we learned publicly so some of

1249

00:48:19,109 --> 00:48:17,599

that i think sir we'll say for closed

1250

00:48:21,430 --> 00:48:19,119

session

1251
00:48:22,950 --> 00:48:21,440
well that goes my next question publicly

1252
00:48:24,790 --> 00:48:22,960
have others

1253
00:48:26,790 --> 00:48:24,800
made anything which would not

1254
00:48:28,309 --> 00:48:26,800
have to be considered closed so i don't

1255
00:48:30,069 --> 00:48:28,319
want you to answer what they've said

1256
00:48:32,390 --> 00:48:30,079
necessarily

1257
00:48:34,710 --> 00:48:32,400
allies have uh have seen these china has

1258
00:48:36,790 --> 00:48:34,720
established its own version of a uap

1259
00:48:39,349 --> 00:48:36,800
task force so clearly a number of

1260
00:48:40,710 --> 00:48:39,359
countries have observations of

1261
00:48:43,030 --> 00:48:40,720
of things in the airspace that they

1262
00:48:46,470 --> 00:48:43,040
can't identify and

1263
00:48:49,910 --> 00:48:46,480

do we share data with some with all

1264

00:48:53,109 --> 00:48:51,510

we share data with some and some share

1265

00:48:54,950 --> 00:48:53,119

data with us

1266

00:48:56,710 --> 00:48:54,960

but not necessarily all that have

1267

00:48:57,589 --> 00:48:56,720

publicly reported something that's

1268

00:48:58,390 --> 00:48:57,599

correct

1269

00:48:59,670 --> 00:48:58,400

okay

1270

00:49:00,950 --> 00:48:59,680

um

1271

00:49:02,549 --> 00:49:00,960

and i think that's

1272

00:49:04,309 --> 00:49:02,559

an important thing and for the other

1273

00:49:05,510 --> 00:49:04,319

session actually that we we don't

1274

00:49:07,750 --> 00:49:05,520

discuss

1275

00:49:09,750 --> 00:49:07,760

that now um

1276
00:49:11,510 --> 00:49:09,760
because you know obviously something

1277
00:49:13,829 --> 00:49:11,520
like this can be

1278
00:49:15,349 --> 00:49:13,839
a national security challenge for us no

1279
00:49:18,069 --> 00:49:15,359
doubt about it if they're developed by

1280
00:49:19,750 --> 00:49:18,079
an adversary

1281
00:49:21,829 --> 00:49:19,760
through some breakthrough

1282
00:49:24,790 --> 00:49:21,839
technology they can be very disruptive

1283
00:49:27,589 --> 00:49:24,800
to our military actions

1284
00:49:31,589 --> 00:49:27,599
or at least serve as a destruction

1285
00:49:33,510 --> 00:49:31,599
so my caution would be be careful who we

1286
00:49:35,829 --> 00:49:33,520
share our data with

1287
00:49:38,790 --> 00:49:35,839
and don't necessarily trust some of the

1288
00:49:41,349 --> 00:49:38,800

data we may get from someone else

1289

00:49:46,790 --> 00:49:41,359

and with that i yield back

1290

00:49:50,069 --> 00:49:48,470

thank you mr chairman

1291

00:49:52,230 --> 00:49:50,079

one of the objectives of this open

1292

00:49:54,309 --> 00:49:52,240

hearing is to

1293

00:49:57,030 --> 00:49:54,319

try to erode some of the stigma that

1294

00:49:58,549 --> 00:49:57,040

attaches to in particular our military

1295

00:50:02,150 --> 00:49:58,559

men and women reporting this it's

1296

00:50:03,829 --> 00:50:02,160

obviously really very serious because uh

1297

00:50:05,990 --> 00:50:03,839

should one of our adversaries have

1298

00:50:07,589 --> 00:50:06,000

developed a technology that we don't

1299

00:50:10,309 --> 00:50:07,599

know about it we need to know about it

1300

00:50:13,030 --> 00:50:10,319

yesterday and and obviously

1301
00:50:14,710 --> 00:50:13,040
any sort of stigma that prevents our our

1302
00:50:15,990 --> 00:50:14,720
uh military

1303
00:50:17,510 --> 00:50:16,000
from reporting this data as

1304
00:50:19,750 --> 00:50:17,520
comprehensively as possible as a

1305
00:50:21,430 --> 00:50:19,760
national security threat so i i really

1306
00:50:23,829 --> 00:50:21,440
just have two questions in the service

1307
00:50:26,150 --> 00:50:23,839
of that goal uh the first is

1308
00:50:28,069 --> 00:50:26,160
um the chairman asked that we run that

1309
00:50:30,150 --> 00:50:28,079
video again most people when they see a

1310
00:50:32,069 --> 00:50:30,160
video we're all used to

1311
00:50:34,150 --> 00:50:32,079
seeing things from a car

1312
00:50:36,710 --> 00:50:34,160
seeing things from a sidewalk very few

1313
00:50:38,470 --> 00:50:36,720

people have the experience of observing

1314

00:50:41,589 --> 00:50:38,480

something through night vision goggles

1315

00:50:44,390 --> 00:50:41,599

at mach 1.5 so just talk for a minute

1316

00:50:45,990 --> 00:50:44,400

about if you would uh whichever of you

1317

00:50:47,990 --> 00:50:46,000

is most appropriate

1318

00:50:50,390 --> 00:50:48,000

how radically different

1319

00:50:52,549 --> 00:50:50,400

observation is at high speed in three

1320

00:50:55,589 --> 00:50:52,559

dimension than it is for most of us who

1321

00:50:57,829 --> 00:50:55,599

walk around and drive cars

1322

00:50:59,349 --> 00:50:57,839

um so the first thing i think that's

1323

00:51:01,829 --> 00:50:59,359

important to note about this is there

1324

00:51:04,950 --> 00:51:01,839

are lots of things when you are moving

1325

00:51:06,630 --> 00:51:04,960

very fast and an object is between you

1326
00:51:07,910 --> 00:51:06,640
and a stationary reference point like

1327
00:51:09,510 --> 00:51:07,920
the ground

1328
00:51:11,910 --> 00:51:09,520
it gives a lot of different impressions

1329
00:51:13,750 --> 00:51:11,920
about how quickly something is or isn't

1330
00:51:16,230 --> 00:51:13,760
moving and it actually

1331
00:51:18,870 --> 00:51:16,240
means that it is a challenge

1332
00:51:20,390 --> 00:51:18,880
especially with narrative based data

1333
00:51:21,990 --> 00:51:20,400
to get a lot of information on that

1334
00:51:23,910 --> 00:51:22,000
that's why the sensor data is so

1335
00:51:26,309 --> 00:51:23,920
important because things do happen very

1336
00:51:27,829 --> 00:51:26,319
quickly as you see there

1337
00:51:29,510 --> 00:51:27,839
and sometimes things that happen very

1338
00:51:31,910 --> 00:51:29,520

quickly something may be moving very

1339

00:51:34,069 --> 00:51:31,920

slow that aircraft is moving quite fast

1340

00:51:37,349 --> 00:51:34,079

how fast that object is moving that goes

1341

00:51:39,510 --> 00:51:37,359

by is probably very slow

1342

00:51:41,829 --> 00:51:39,520

so i get i guess my point is that an

1343

00:51:43,589 --> 00:51:41,839

observation either a visual observation

1344

00:51:46,230 --> 00:51:43,599

or a uh

1345

00:51:48,950 --> 00:51:46,240

a electronic observation infrared or

1346

00:51:51,510 --> 00:51:48,960

whatever uh looks radically different

1347

00:51:54,710 --> 00:51:51,520

than it does to most people

1348

00:51:56,549 --> 00:51:54,720

even instruments uh instruments are on

1349

00:51:59,270 --> 00:51:56,559

gimbals and that sort of thing so that

1350

00:52:01,349 --> 00:51:59,280

creates a very unusual

1351

00:52:03,030 --> 00:52:01,359

uh view to again those of us who are

1352

00:52:06,230 --> 00:52:03,040

used to seeing things on in two

1353

00:52:08,790 --> 00:52:07,829

second question

1354

00:52:10,309 --> 00:52:08,800

um

1355

00:52:13,270 --> 00:52:10,319

i think mr bray you said something that

1356

00:52:16,390 --> 00:52:13,280

i want to unpack a little bit uh

1357

00:52:17,670 --> 00:52:16,400

a number of these uaps you said we can't

1358

00:52:20,549 --> 00:52:17,680

explain

1359

00:52:23,349 --> 00:52:20,559

again in the service of sort of reducing

1360

00:52:24,870 --> 00:52:23,359

speculation and conspiracy theories we

1361

00:52:26,710 --> 00:52:24,880

can't explain

1362

00:52:29,030 --> 00:52:26,720

can range from

1363

00:52:30,630 --> 00:52:29,040

a visual observation that was distant on

1364

00:52:32,309 --> 00:52:30,640

a foggy night we don't know what it is

1365

00:52:34,549 --> 00:52:32,319

to

1366

00:52:36,630 --> 00:52:34,559

we've found an organic material that we

1367

00:52:39,430 --> 00:52:36,640

can identify right those are radically

1368

00:52:41,430 --> 00:52:39,440

different world worlds so when you say

1369

00:52:42,549 --> 00:52:41,440

we can't explain give the public a

1370

00:52:44,950 --> 00:52:42,559

little bit

1371

00:52:47,270 --> 00:52:44,960

better sense of where on that spectrum

1372

00:52:49,829 --> 00:52:47,280

of we can't explain we are are we

1373

00:52:51,670 --> 00:52:49,839

holding materials organic or inorganic

1374

00:52:53,510 --> 00:52:51,680

that we don't know about are we

1375

00:52:55,750 --> 00:52:53,520

you know picking up emanations that are

1376
00:52:57,030 --> 00:52:55,760
something other than light or infrared

1377
00:52:58,710 --> 00:52:57,040
that could be deemed to be

1378
00:53:01,030 --> 00:52:58,720
communications give us a sense for what

1379
00:53:03,670 --> 00:53:01,040
you mean when you say we can't explain

1380
00:53:05,270 --> 00:53:03,680
sure when i say we can't explain i mean

1381
00:53:07,349 --> 00:53:05,280
exactly as you described there that

1382
00:53:08,870 --> 00:53:07,359
there is a lot of information like the

1383
00:53:10,950 --> 00:53:08,880
video that we showed in which there's

1384
00:53:13,270 --> 00:53:10,960
simply too little data

1385
00:53:14,950 --> 00:53:13,280
to to create a reasonable explanation

1386
00:53:17,270 --> 00:53:14,960
there are a small handful of cases in

1387
00:53:19,190 --> 00:53:17,280
which we have more data

1388
00:53:21,990 --> 00:53:19,200

that our analysis simply hasn't been

1389

00:53:25,510 --> 00:53:22,000

able to uh to fully pull together a

1390

00:53:26,870 --> 00:53:25,520

picture of what happened um the

1391

00:53:29,510 --> 00:53:26,880

and those are the cases where we talk

1392

00:53:30,870 --> 00:53:29,520

about where we see some indications of

1393

00:53:31,910 --> 00:53:30,880

flight characteristics or signature

1394

00:53:34,549 --> 00:53:31,920

management

1395

00:53:36,150 --> 00:53:34,559

that are not what we had expected

1396

00:53:38,069 --> 00:53:36,160

when it comes to material that we have

1397

00:53:40,630 --> 00:53:38,079

we have no material

1398

00:53:43,510 --> 00:53:40,640

we have detected no emanations

1399

00:53:45,950 --> 00:53:43,520

within the uap task force that that is

1400

00:53:49,510 --> 00:53:45,960

uh that would suggest it's anything

1401
00:53:51,349 --> 00:53:49,520
non-terrestrial uh in origin so there's

1402
00:53:52,549 --> 00:53:51,359
um when i say unexplained i mean

1403
00:53:54,549 --> 00:53:52,559
everything from

1404
00:53:56,870 --> 00:53:54,559
too little too little data

1405
00:53:58,950 --> 00:53:56,880
to we simply the data that we have

1406
00:54:00,549 --> 00:53:58,960
doesn't point us towards an explanation

1407
00:54:01,990 --> 00:54:00,559
uh but we'll go wherever the data takes

1408
00:54:03,990 --> 00:54:02,000
us again we've made no assumptions about

1409
00:54:05,990 --> 00:54:04,000
what this is or isn't uh we're committed

1410
00:54:07,910 --> 00:54:06,000
to understanding these and so we'll go

1411
00:54:09,270 --> 00:54:07,920
wherever that data takes us

1412
00:54:11,510 --> 00:54:09,280
thank you that's that's very helpful

1413
00:54:14,069 --> 00:54:11,520

until i think it bears emphasis

1414

00:54:16,790 --> 00:54:14,079

when you say we can't explain everything

1415

00:54:18,549 --> 00:54:16,800

that you can't explain is in a bucket

1416

00:54:21,270 --> 00:54:18,559

called data

1417

00:54:23,510 --> 00:54:21,280

is that correct and that would mean uh

1418

00:54:25,829 --> 00:54:23,520

data collected by sensors visual

1419

00:54:28,069 --> 00:54:25,839

observations everything that we can't

1420

00:54:31,030 --> 00:54:28,079

explain quote-unquote is in a bucket

1421

00:54:33,510 --> 00:54:31,040

called data right a narrative report uh

1422

00:54:35,190 --> 00:54:33,520

from uh from the early 2000s if it just

1423

00:54:36,950 --> 00:54:35,200

had a little bit of information on it

1424

00:54:38,950 --> 00:54:36,960

would be in our database and it would be

1425

00:54:40,630 --> 00:54:38,960

unresolved i would add to that it's

1426

00:54:42,870 --> 00:54:40,640

insufficient data i mean that's one of

1427

00:54:45,990 --> 00:54:42,880

the challenges we have insufficient data

1428

00:54:48,870 --> 00:54:46,000

either on the event itself the object

1429

00:54:51,430 --> 00:54:48,880

itself or insufficient data or plug-in

1430

00:54:52,870 --> 00:54:51,440

with some other organization or agency

1431

00:54:55,510 --> 00:54:52,880

that may have had something in that

1432

00:54:57,030 --> 00:54:55,520

space at that time so it's a data issue

1433

00:54:58,789 --> 00:54:57,040

that we're that we're facing in many of

1434

00:55:00,870 --> 00:54:58,799

these instances congressman understood

1435

00:55:04,230 --> 00:55:00,880

thank you very much yieldback

1436

00:55:05,270 --> 00:55:04,240

gentlemen yields back mr gallagher

1437

00:55:06,870 --> 00:55:05,280

thank you mr chairman thank you for

1438

00:55:08,390 --> 00:55:06,880

allowing me to join this hearing um i

1439

00:55:11,589 --> 00:55:08,400

really appreciate the witnesses

1440

00:55:14,309 --> 00:55:11,599

testimony um mr moultrie as the chairman

1441

00:55:17,109 --> 00:55:14,319

uh mentioned uh dod had initiative to

1442

00:55:18,230 --> 00:55:17,119

study ufos in the 1960s called project

1443

00:55:20,069 --> 00:55:18,240

blue book

1444

00:55:22,549 --> 00:55:20,079

it's also been well reported in our

1445

00:55:24,230 --> 00:55:22,559

briefing and in other places that we

1446

00:55:27,510 --> 00:55:24,240

have more have more recent projects

1447

00:55:30,230 --> 00:55:27,520

specifically atip could you describe any

1448

00:55:33,030 --> 00:55:30,240

other initiatives that the dod or dod

1449

00:55:35,750 --> 00:55:33,040

contractors have managed after project

1450

00:55:38,230 --> 00:55:35,760

blue book ended and prior to atip

1451
00:55:39,829 --> 00:55:38,240
beginning did anything also predate

1452
00:55:41,829 --> 00:55:39,839
project blue book

1453
00:55:43,109 --> 00:55:41,839
so i i can't speak to what may have

1454
00:55:45,030 --> 00:55:43,119
predated

1455
00:55:46,390 --> 00:55:45,040
project blue book i mean of course

1456
00:55:47,510 --> 00:55:46,400
there's roswell and all these other

1457
00:55:49,109 --> 00:55:47,520
things that people have talked about

1458
00:55:50,870 --> 00:55:49,119
over the years

1459
00:55:54,309 --> 00:55:50,880
i'm familiar with blue book i'm familiar

1460
00:55:57,030 --> 00:55:54,319
with uh with atip uh i haven't seen

1461
00:55:59,190 --> 00:55:57,040
other documented studies that have been

1462
00:56:00,309 --> 00:55:59,200
done by dod in that regard

1463
00:56:02,950 --> 00:56:00,319

so you're not aware of anything in

1464

00:56:04,789 --> 00:56:02,960

between project blue book and atip not

1465

00:56:06,789 --> 00:56:04,799

aware of anything that's uh official

1466

00:56:09,990 --> 00:56:06,799

that was done in between those two

1467

00:56:11,510 --> 00:56:10,000

hasn't been brought to my attention okay

1468

00:56:14,630 --> 00:56:11,520

additionally are you aware of any other

1469

00:56:17,430 --> 00:56:14,640

dod or dod contract programs focused on

1470

00:56:19,349 --> 00:56:17,440

uaps from a technological engineering

1471

00:56:21,109 --> 00:56:19,359

perspective and by that i mean are you

1472

00:56:22,710 --> 00:56:21,119

aware of any technology initiatives

1473

00:56:24,710 --> 00:56:22,720

focused on this topic

1474

00:56:26,069 --> 00:56:24,720

other than initiatives focused on the

1475

00:56:28,230 --> 00:56:26,079

individual case

1476

00:56:31,030 --> 00:56:28,240

investigations i am not aware of any

1477

00:56:31,990 --> 00:56:31,040

contractual programs that are focused on

1478

00:56:34,309 --> 00:56:32,000

uh

1479

00:56:36,150 --> 00:56:34,319

any anything related to

1480

00:56:38,549 --> 00:56:36,160

this other than what we are doing in the

1481

00:56:40,470 --> 00:56:38,559

navy task force and what we are about to

1482

00:56:42,789 --> 00:56:40,480

launch in terms of our effort

1483

00:56:44,150 --> 00:56:42,799

same question for you mr bray

1484

00:56:46,150 --> 00:56:44,160

same answer not aware of anything

1485

00:56:47,750 --> 00:56:46,160

outside what we uh are doing in the uap

1486

00:56:49,670 --> 00:56:47,760

task force so just confirm you're not

1487

00:56:51,670 --> 00:56:49,680

aware of any technology or engineering

1488

00:56:53,109 --> 00:56:51,680

resources that have been focused on

1489

00:56:54,549 --> 00:56:53,119

these efforts besides what we've

1490

00:56:59,030 --> 00:56:54,559

mentioned today

1491

00:56:59,910 --> 00:56:59,040

once again i'll say no contractual uh

1492

00:57:04,870 --> 00:56:59,920

or

1493

00:57:06,710 --> 00:57:04,880

involved the reason why i i qualify

1494

00:57:08,710 --> 00:57:06,720

yeah let me qualify it that way

1495

00:57:10,150 --> 00:57:08,720

i can't speak to what people may be

1496

00:57:11,510 --> 00:57:10,160

looking at in the department somebody

1497

00:57:12,870 --> 00:57:11,520

says i'm looking at something i'm

1498

00:57:15,109 --> 00:57:12,880

looking at something that may be

1499

00:57:16,950 --> 00:57:15,119

unidentified and i can't speak to that

1500

00:57:18,230 --> 00:57:16,960

speak to official programs we have on

1501
00:57:19,910 --> 00:57:18,240
the record

1502
00:57:22,630 --> 00:57:19,920
it's also been reported that there have

1503
00:57:24,150 --> 00:57:22,640
been uap observed and interacting with

1504
00:57:25,910 --> 00:57:24,160
and flying over sensitive military

1505
00:57:27,910 --> 00:57:25,920
facilities particularly not just ranges

1506
00:57:29,829 --> 00:57:27,920
but uh some facilities housing our

1507
00:57:32,630 --> 00:57:29,839
strategic nuclear forces one such

1508
00:57:34,630 --> 00:57:32,640
incident allegedly occurred

1509
00:57:36,230 --> 00:57:34,640
at malmstrom air force base in which 10

1510
00:57:38,470 --> 00:57:36,240
of our nuclear icbms were rendered

1511
00:57:40,230 --> 00:57:38,480
inoperable at the same time a glowing

1512
00:57:41,670 --> 00:57:40,240
red orb was observed overhead i'm not

1513
00:57:43,910 --> 00:57:41,680

commenting on the accuracy of this i'm

1514

00:57:45,349 --> 00:57:43,920

simply asking you whether you're aware

1515

00:57:46,870 --> 00:57:45,359

of it and whether you have any comment

1516

00:57:48,390 --> 00:57:46,880

on the accuracy of that report we passed

1517

00:57:50,230 --> 00:57:48,400

that to mr bray if you've been looking

1518

00:57:52,390 --> 00:57:50,240

at the uaps over the last three years

1519

00:57:54,870 --> 00:57:52,400

that data is not within the holdings of

1520

00:57:58,069 --> 00:57:54,880

the uap task force

1521

00:57:59,510 --> 00:57:58,079

okay but are you aware of the the report

1522

00:58:01,349 --> 00:57:59,520

or that the data

1523

00:58:03,270 --> 00:58:01,359

exists somewhere

1524

00:58:05,030 --> 00:58:03,280

i i have uh

1525

00:58:06,309 --> 00:58:05,040

i have heard stories i have not seen the

1526

00:58:09,030 --> 00:58:06,319

official data on that so you've just

1527

00:58:11,589 --> 00:58:09,040

seen informal stories no official

1528

00:58:13,990 --> 00:58:11,599

assessment that you've done or exists

1529

00:58:17,349 --> 00:58:14,000

within dod that you're aware of uh

1530

00:58:18,710 --> 00:58:17,359

regarding the malmstrom incident

1531

00:58:20,390 --> 00:58:18,720

all i can speak to is you know what's

1532

00:58:22,789 --> 00:58:20,400

within my cognizance the uap task force

1533

00:58:23,829 --> 00:58:22,799

and we have not looked at that incident

1534

00:58:25,910 --> 00:58:23,839

well i was i missed a pretty high

1535

00:58:28,710 --> 00:58:25,920

profile incident i i don't claim to be

1536

00:58:30,789 --> 00:58:28,720

an expert on this but that's out there

1537

00:58:31,750 --> 00:58:30,799

in the ether

1538

00:58:33,829 --> 00:58:31,760

you're you're the guy who's

1539

00:58:35,270 --> 00:58:33,839

investigating it i mean who else is

1540

00:58:36,950 --> 00:58:35,280

doing it if something was officially

1541

00:58:38,470 --> 00:58:36,960

brought to our attention we would look

1542

00:58:39,589 --> 00:58:38,480

at it uh there are many things that are

1543

00:58:41,190 --> 00:58:39,599

out there in the ether that aren't

1544

00:58:42,630 --> 00:58:41,200

officially brought to our attention how

1545

00:58:44,870 --> 00:58:42,640

would it have to be officially brought

1546

00:58:46,870 --> 00:58:44,880

to you i'm bringing it to you

1547

00:58:48,390 --> 00:58:46,880

this is pretty official sure so we'll go

1548

00:58:50,150 --> 00:58:48,400

back and take a look at it but generally

1549

00:58:51,990 --> 00:58:50,160

there is some

1550

00:58:53,430 --> 00:58:52,000

authoritative figure that says there is

1551
00:58:54,870 --> 00:58:53,440
an incident that occurred we'd like you

1552
00:58:56,470 --> 00:58:54,880
to look at this

1553
00:58:57,990 --> 00:58:56,480
but in terms of just tracking what may

1554
00:59:00,390 --> 00:58:58,000
be in the media that says that something

1555
00:59:01,910 --> 00:59:00,400
occurred at this time at this place

1556
00:59:03,109 --> 00:59:01,920
there are probably a lot of leads that

1557
00:59:04,470 --> 00:59:03,119
we would have to follow up on i don't

1558
00:59:05,589 --> 00:59:04,480
think we were resourced to do that right

1559
00:59:07,349 --> 00:59:05,599
now well i don't claim to be an

1560
00:59:09,430 --> 00:59:07,359
authoritative figure but for what it's

1561
00:59:10,789 --> 00:59:09,440
worth i would like you to look into it

1562
00:59:12,950 --> 00:59:10,799
for another reason you could dismiss it

1563
00:59:15,349 --> 00:59:12,960

and say this is not worth wasting

1564

00:59:16,950 --> 00:59:15,359

resources on um and then finally are you

1565

00:59:19,190 --> 00:59:16,960

aware of a document that appeared around

1566

00:59:23,430 --> 00:59:19,200

2019 uh sometimes called the admiral

1567

00:59:25,990 --> 00:59:23,440

wilson memo or ew notes memo

1568

00:59:27,990 --> 00:59:26,000

i am i'm not are you trying i'm not

1569

00:59:29,589 --> 00:59:28,000

personally aware of that okay this is a

1570

00:59:31,510 --> 00:59:29,599

document in which again i'm not

1571

00:59:33,190 --> 00:59:31,520

commenting on veracity i was hoping you

1572

00:59:35,109 --> 00:59:33,200

would help me with that in which a

1573

00:59:37,670 --> 00:59:35,119

former head of dia claims to have had a

1574

00:59:39,430 --> 00:59:37,680

conversation with the doctor eric wilson

1575

00:59:41,270 --> 00:59:39,440

and claims to have uh sort of been made

1576

00:59:44,549 --> 00:59:41,280

aware of certain

1577

00:59:46,470 --> 00:59:44,559

contractors or dod programs um that he

1578

00:59:47,750 --> 00:59:46,480

tried to get fuller access to and was

1579

00:59:50,870 --> 00:59:47,760

denied

1580

00:59:52,870 --> 00:59:50,880

access to um so you're not aware of that

1581

00:59:54,230 --> 00:59:52,880

i'm malware congressman uh in my 10

1582

00:59:55,990 --> 00:59:54,240

seconds remaining then i guess i just

1583

01:00:00,230 --> 00:59:56,000

would ask mr chairman unanimous consent

1584

01:00:04,069 --> 01:00:02,069

without objection thank you mr chairman

1585

01:00:06,789 --> 01:00:04,079

appreciate it

1586

01:00:08,390 --> 01:00:06,799

mr christian murthy

1587

01:00:10,230 --> 01:00:08,400

thank you mr chair and thank you to both

1588

01:00:13,349 --> 01:00:10,240

of you for appearing today and for your

1589

01:00:15,829 --> 01:00:13,359

public service first question is uh

1590

01:00:19,109 --> 01:00:15,839

there have been no collisions between

1591

01:00:20,309 --> 01:00:19,119

any u.s assets in one of these uaps

1592

01:00:21,829 --> 01:00:20,319

correct

1593

01:00:23,990 --> 01:00:21,839

we haven't had a collision we've had at

1594

01:00:25,910 --> 01:00:24,000

least 11 near misses though

1595

01:00:27,510 --> 01:00:25,920

and

1596

01:00:29,270 --> 01:00:27,520

maybe we'll talk about those 11 near

1597

01:00:30,470 --> 01:00:29,280

misses or any place where there's close

1598

01:00:32,470 --> 01:00:30,480

proximity

1599

01:00:35,109 --> 01:00:32,480

um i assume

1600

01:00:37,109 --> 01:00:35,119

or tell me if i'm wrong there's been no

1601
01:00:39,430 --> 01:00:37,119
uh attempt

1602
01:00:42,870 --> 01:00:39,440
there's no communications

1603
01:00:45,910 --> 01:00:42,880
uh or any kind of uh communication

1604
01:00:48,470 --> 01:00:45,920
signals that emanate from those objects

1605
01:00:50,309 --> 01:00:48,480
uh that we've detected correct

1606
01:00:52,390 --> 01:00:50,319
that's correct and have we attempted to

1607
01:00:53,910 --> 01:00:52,400
communicate with those objects

1608
01:00:55,430 --> 01:00:53,920
uh

1609
01:00:58,309 --> 01:00:55,440
no

1610
01:01:01,430 --> 01:00:58,319
so we don't we don't even put out an

1611
01:01:02,549 --> 01:01:01,440
alert saying you know uh us

1612
01:01:05,109 --> 01:01:02,559
um

1613
01:01:07,109 --> 01:01:05,119

identi you know identify yourself

1614

01:01:08,470 --> 01:01:07,119

uh you are you know within our flight

1615

01:01:11,030 --> 01:01:08,480

path or something like that we we

1616

01:01:12,870 --> 01:01:11,040

haven't said anything like that

1617

01:01:15,589 --> 01:01:12,880

we've not put anything out like that

1618

01:01:16,789 --> 01:01:15,599

generally speaking uh what you know for

1619

01:01:19,109 --> 01:01:16,799

example in the video that we showed

1620

01:01:21,750 --> 01:01:19,119

earlier uh it appears to be something

1621

01:01:23,349 --> 01:01:21,760

that is uh you know unmanned uh appears

1622

01:01:25,750 --> 01:01:23,359

to be something that uh

1623

01:01:27,990 --> 01:01:25,760

may or may not be in controlled flight

1624

01:01:30,630 --> 01:01:28,000

uh and so we've not attempted any

1625

01:01:32,870 --> 01:01:30,640

communication with that

1626

01:01:35,349 --> 01:01:32,880

okay so um

1627

01:01:38,950 --> 01:01:35,359

and i assume we've never discharged any

1628

01:01:40,069 --> 01:01:38,960

armaments against a uap correct

1629

01:01:42,309 --> 01:01:40,079

that's correct

1630

01:01:44,950 --> 01:01:42,319

um how about wreckage

1631

01:01:47,589 --> 01:01:44,960

have we come across any wreckage

1632

01:01:49,510 --> 01:01:47,599

of any kind of

1633

01:01:52,870 --> 01:01:49,520

object that

1634

01:01:54,230 --> 01:01:52,880

has now been examined by you

1635

01:01:57,109 --> 01:01:54,240

the uap task force doesn't have any

1636

01:01:58,230 --> 01:01:57,119

wreckage that isn't uh explainable that

1637

01:02:00,230 --> 01:01:58,240

isn't consistent with being of

1638

01:02:02,150 --> 01:02:00,240

terrestrial origin do we have any

1639

01:02:04,230 --> 01:02:02,160

sensors underwater

1640

01:02:08,150 --> 01:02:04,240

to

1641

01:02:10,230 --> 01:02:08,160

detect on submerged uaps uh anything

1642

01:02:11,910 --> 01:02:10,240

that is in the ocean or in the seas so i

1643

01:02:14,470 --> 01:02:11,920

think that would be more appropriately

1644

01:02:16,309 --> 01:02:14,480

addressed in closed session sir okay

1645

01:02:18,470 --> 01:02:16,319

um

1646

01:02:19,349 --> 01:02:18,480

i think one of the biggest questions

1647

01:02:22,150 --> 01:02:19,359

that

1648

01:02:24,549 --> 01:02:22,160

um

1649

01:02:25,589 --> 01:02:24,559

we say with a lot of probability we say

1650

01:02:27,589 --> 01:02:25,599

they

1651
01:02:30,470 --> 01:02:27,599
quote unquote probably do represent

1652
01:02:31,829 --> 01:02:30,480
physical objects close quote

1653
01:02:34,950 --> 01:02:31,839
um

1654
01:02:37,029 --> 01:02:34,960
when we say probably is that because we

1655
01:02:40,150 --> 01:02:37,039
cannot conclusively

1656
01:02:41,510 --> 01:02:40,160
say that they are physical objects

1657
01:02:42,630 --> 01:02:41,520
in the task force

1658
01:02:44,950 --> 01:02:42,640
report

1659
01:02:46,230 --> 01:02:44,960
when i say probably represent physical

1660
01:02:49,670 --> 01:02:46,240
objects

1661
01:02:50,710 --> 01:02:49,680
there could be some that are more of a

1662
01:02:51,990 --> 01:02:50,720
uh

1663
01:02:53,589 --> 01:02:52,000

of a

1664

01:02:55,109 --> 01:02:53,599

meteorological phenomena something like

1665

01:02:58,150 --> 01:02:55,119

that that may not

1666

01:02:59,349 --> 01:02:58,160

uh maybe a physical object in the

1667

01:03:01,190 --> 01:02:59,359

in the sense that most people think of

1668

01:03:03,670 --> 01:03:01,200

something you go up and touch but the

1669

01:03:05,990 --> 01:03:03,680

ones where you say most of them

1670

01:03:08,789 --> 01:03:06,000

represent physical objects can you say

1671

01:03:11,589 --> 01:03:08,799

that they are definitely like with 100

1672

01:03:13,510 --> 01:03:11,599

certainty that they are physical objects

1673

01:03:15,510 --> 01:03:13,520

i can say with certainty that a number

1674

01:03:17,829 --> 01:03:15,520

of these are physical objects

1675

01:03:20,069 --> 01:03:17,839

okay so there we can't rule out that

1676
01:03:23,029 --> 01:03:20,079
some of them may not be physical objects

1677
01:03:25,349 --> 01:03:23,039
some certainly could be a sensor anomaly

1678
01:03:28,710 --> 01:03:25,359
or something like that some could be

1679
01:03:31,109 --> 01:03:28,720
now how about uh with regard to uaps

1680
01:03:32,230 --> 01:03:31,119
we've talked about uaps on training

1681
01:03:34,230 --> 01:03:32,240
areas

1682
01:03:36,150 --> 01:03:34,240
but obviously

1683
01:03:39,589 --> 01:03:36,160
there's some sensor bias i would think

1684
01:03:41,510 --> 01:03:39,599
we we put sensors in training areas

1685
01:03:45,750 --> 01:03:41,520
how about with regards to non-training

1686
01:03:48,789 --> 01:03:45,760
areas do we track what's an open source

1687
01:03:51,750 --> 01:03:48,799
and what civilians and others have

1688
01:03:53,029 --> 01:03:51,760

tracked and have we found similarities

1689

01:03:55,109 --> 01:03:53,039

to

1690

01:03:57,589 --> 01:03:55,119

what they've observed in terms of uaps

1691

01:03:59,750 --> 01:03:57,599

in non-training areas to the ones that

1692

01:04:01,589 --> 01:03:59,760

are in training areas

1693

01:04:03,029 --> 01:04:01,599

the uap task force has

1694

01:04:05,029 --> 01:04:03,039

worked very hard to to make sure the

1695

01:04:07,670 --> 01:04:05,039

data set that we're working with is a

1696

01:04:09,029 --> 01:04:07,680

data set that we have very good control

1697

01:04:11,270 --> 01:04:09,039

over that data

1698

01:04:12,870 --> 01:04:11,280

so we have some partnerships with faa so

1699

01:04:15,349 --> 01:04:12,880

that we get some of that so we get that

1700

01:04:17,430 --> 01:04:15,359

reporting in um but if it comes to just

1701

01:04:18,710 --> 01:04:17,440

you know open source reports or someone

1702

01:04:20,069 --> 01:04:18,720

says that they saw something that

1703

01:04:22,710 --> 01:04:20,079

generally does not make it into our

1704

01:04:25,910 --> 01:04:22,720

database so basically it sounds like we

1705

01:04:27,829 --> 01:04:25,920

have a good partnership with faa

1706

01:04:29,990 --> 01:04:27,839

but apart from faa we don't have

1707

01:04:31,029 --> 01:04:30,000

partnerships with other agencies or

1708

01:04:33,510 --> 01:04:31,039

other

1709

01:04:34,630 --> 01:04:33,520

entities that might be tracking so that

1710

01:04:37,430 --> 01:04:34,640

we could

1711

01:04:39,270 --> 01:04:37,440

enlarge our data set to make comparison

1712

01:04:41,430 --> 01:04:39,280

so we will so that's the goal of this

1713

01:04:43,750 --> 01:04:41,440

next effort will be to uh expand that

1714

01:04:45,670 --> 01:04:43,760

relationship with the uh the rest of

1715

01:04:47,029 --> 01:04:45,680

government and the interagency so we can

1716

01:04:49,589 --> 01:04:47,039

understand what they're seeing what

1717

01:04:51,190 --> 01:04:49,599

we're seeing we can correlate on uh each

1718

01:04:53,109 --> 01:04:51,200

other's holdings because they resolve

1719

01:04:55,349 --> 01:04:53,119

this sorry to interrupt but i think that

1720

01:04:57,270 --> 01:04:55,359

we're we might have a bias right now

1721

01:04:59,190 --> 01:04:57,280

going on with regards to just reporting

1722

01:05:00,950 --> 01:04:59,200

on uaps being in training areas when we

1723

01:05:02,950 --> 01:05:00,960

don't really track what's happening

1724

01:05:04,870 --> 01:05:02,960

elsewhere last question have our

1725

01:05:07,670 --> 01:05:04,880

encounters with uaps alter the

1726

01:05:09,750 --> 01:05:07,680

development of our either our offense or

1727

01:05:12,470 --> 01:05:09,760

offensive or defensive capabilities or

1728

01:05:14,549 --> 01:05:12,480

even our sensor capabilities

1729

01:05:17,829 --> 01:05:14,559

we'll take that for the closed session

1730

01:05:20,230 --> 01:05:17,839

okay great thank you

1731

01:05:21,990 --> 01:05:20,240

mr lahood

1732

01:05:24,789 --> 01:05:22,000

thank you mr chairman and i want to

1733

01:05:28,230 --> 01:05:24,799

thank the witnesses for being here today

1734

01:05:30,470 --> 01:05:28,240

uh obviously this topic of uaps uh has

1735

01:05:31,430 --> 01:05:30,480

attracted a lot of interest in people

1736

01:05:32,630 --> 01:05:31,440

that are

1737

01:05:36,549 --> 01:05:32,640

um

1738

01:05:38,789 --> 01:05:36,559

curious about uh this this hearing today

1739

01:05:40,789 --> 01:05:38,799

as we talk about um

1740

01:05:41,750 --> 01:05:40,799

and i would say there's a lot of what i

1741

01:05:44,069 --> 01:05:41,760

would call

1742

01:05:46,549 --> 01:05:44,079

amateur interest groups uh that are

1743

01:05:49,950 --> 01:05:46,559

involved in the uap field

1744

01:05:52,470 --> 01:05:49,960

mike my question is when um there are

1745

01:05:54,630 --> 01:05:52,480

unsubstantiated claims or manufactured

1746

01:05:56,549 --> 01:05:54,640

claims of uaps or

1747

01:05:58,230 --> 01:05:56,559

kind of false information that's put out

1748

01:06:00,390 --> 01:05:58,240

there uh

1749

01:06:02,150 --> 01:06:00,400

what are the consequences for people

1750

01:06:07,029 --> 01:06:02,160

that are involved with that or groups

1751
01:06:09,589 --> 01:06:08,789
so one of the concerns that we have is

1752
01:06:20,309 --> 01:06:09,599
that

1753
01:06:22,710 --> 01:06:20,319
could be considered to be somewhat

1754
01:06:23,910 --> 01:06:22,720
self-serving uh we're trying to do

1755
01:06:26,069 --> 01:06:23,920
what's in the what's in the best

1756
01:06:28,230 --> 01:06:26,079
interests of one the department of

1757
01:06:30,390 --> 01:06:28,240
defense and then two what's in the best

1758
01:06:33,670 --> 01:06:30,400
interest of the public to ensure that we

1759
01:06:35,510 --> 01:06:33,680
can put factual based information back

1760
01:06:36,710 --> 01:06:35,520
into the mainstream and back into the

1761
01:06:38,710 --> 01:06:36,720
bloodstream

1762
01:06:40,710 --> 01:06:38,720
of the reporting

1763
01:06:41,990 --> 01:06:40,720

media that we have so people understand

1764

01:06:45,430 --> 01:06:42,000

what's there

1765

01:06:47,510 --> 01:06:45,440

it's important because we are attempting

1766

01:06:48,870 --> 01:06:47,520

as this hearing as has drawn out to

1767

01:06:51,510 --> 01:06:48,880

understand

1768

01:06:54,710 --> 01:06:51,520

one what may just be natural phenomenon

1769

01:06:56,230 --> 01:06:54,720

to what may be sensor phenomenology or

1770

01:06:57,190 --> 01:06:56,240

things that were happening with sensors

1771

01:06:58,950 --> 01:06:57,200

three

1772

01:07:01,430 --> 01:06:58,960

what may be legitimate counter

1773

01:07:03,029 --> 01:07:01,440

intelligence threats to

1774

01:07:05,510 --> 01:07:03,039

places that we have or bases or

1775

01:07:06,710 --> 01:07:05,520

installations or security threats to our

1776

01:07:09,589 --> 01:07:06,720

platforms

1777

01:07:11,109 --> 01:07:09,599

and anything that diverts us off of what

1778

01:07:13,430 --> 01:07:11,119

we have with the resources that have

1779

01:07:14,870 --> 01:07:13,440

been allocated to us send us off in

1780

01:07:16,710 --> 01:07:14,880

these spurious

1781

01:07:18,309 --> 01:07:16,720

chases and hunts that are just not

1782

01:07:20,309 --> 01:07:18,319

helpful and they also helped that well

1783

01:07:23,190 --> 01:07:20,319

they also contribute to the undermining

1784

01:07:25,270 --> 01:07:23,200

of the confidence that the congress and

1785

01:07:27,910 --> 01:07:25,280

the american people have that we are

1786

01:07:30,150 --> 01:07:27,920

trying to get to the root cause of

1787

01:07:31,990 --> 01:07:30,160

what's happening here report on that and

1788

01:07:34,390 --> 01:07:32,000

then feed that back into our national

1789

01:07:36,150 --> 01:07:34,400

security apparatus so we are able to

1790

01:07:39,029 --> 01:07:36,160

protect the american people and our

1791

01:07:40,789 --> 01:07:39,039

allies so it is harmful it is hurtful

1792

01:07:42,870 --> 01:07:40,799

but hopefully if we get more information

1793

01:07:44,789 --> 01:07:42,880

out there we'll start to lessen the

1794

01:07:47,750 --> 01:07:44,799

impact of some of those spurious reports

1795

01:07:49,750 --> 01:07:47,760

so so just taking that a step further so

1796

01:07:51,750 --> 01:07:49,760

though that misinformation false

1797

01:07:53,270 --> 01:07:51,760

narratives manufactured so what are the

1798

01:07:54,950 --> 01:07:53,280

consequences are there legal

1799

01:07:56,470 --> 01:07:54,960

consequences are there examples that you

1800

01:07:58,710 --> 01:07:56,480

can give us where people have been held

1801

01:08:01,109 --> 01:07:58,720

accountable by this misinformation or

1802

01:08:02,950 --> 01:08:01,119

disinformation i i can't give you you

1803

01:08:05,670 --> 01:08:02,960

know any examples where somebody's been

1804

01:08:07,670 --> 01:08:05,680

legally held liable for putting

1805

01:08:09,270 --> 01:08:07,680

something out there but well i guess

1806

01:08:12,309 --> 01:08:09,280

what's the deterrent from people

1807

01:08:14,309 --> 01:08:12,319

engaging in this activity yeah

1808

01:08:16,709 --> 01:08:14,319

i don't i don't know i i don't have that

1809

01:08:19,110 --> 01:08:16,719

answer that's something that uh you know

1810

01:08:21,269 --> 01:08:19,120

welcome to dialogue with congress to

1811

01:08:23,430 --> 01:08:21,279

talk about that with the members who you

1812

01:08:25,430 --> 01:08:23,440

know help legislate those laws and say

1813

01:08:27,669 --> 01:08:25,440

what should be the uh the legal

1814

01:08:29,829 --> 01:08:27,679

ramifications that we could use to

1815

01:08:31,189 --> 01:08:29,839

potentially hold individuals accountable

1816

01:08:32,630 --> 01:08:31,199

whether it be

1817

01:08:35,749 --> 01:08:32,640

citizens or

1818

01:08:39,030 --> 01:08:35,759

information that might be injected into

1819

01:08:40,630 --> 01:08:39,040

our media by other uh other forces or

1820

01:08:43,030 --> 01:08:40,640

other countries if you will

1821

01:08:45,110 --> 01:08:43,040

and in terms of dods and uh you know

1822

01:08:47,590 --> 01:08:45,120

review and analysis in this field i mean

1823

01:08:49,189 --> 01:08:47,600

is there is there a standard in place

1824

01:08:51,349 --> 01:08:49,199

when it comes to uaps i mean is there

1825

01:08:54,550 --> 01:08:51,359

any guidance you look to that's codified

1826
01:08:56,709 --> 01:08:54,560
in law or otherwise within dod that kind

1827
01:08:58,470 --> 01:08:56,719
of sets out the standards for uaps and

1828
01:09:00,309 --> 01:08:58,480
and what to look for i think that's part

1829
01:09:02,550 --> 01:09:00,319
of what the the the group that we're

1830
01:09:04,470 --> 01:09:02,560
standing up now will be uh charted to do

1831
01:09:06,390 --> 01:09:04,480
we're actually from my organization

1832
01:09:07,669 --> 01:09:06,400
we'll be looking at policy and standards

1833
01:09:08,709 --> 01:09:07,679
that we have

1834
01:09:12,709 --> 01:09:08,719
to

1835
01:09:14,470 --> 01:09:12,719
actually put in place and promulgate

1836
01:09:16,309 --> 01:09:14,480
across our government

1837
01:09:19,749 --> 01:09:16,319
thank you i yield back

1838
01:09:21,030 --> 01:09:19,759

gentleman yields back mr welch

1839

01:09:23,349 --> 01:09:21,040

thank you i'm gonna file i'm gonna

1840

01:09:26,309 --> 01:09:23,359

follow on the the line of questions from

1841

01:09:28,229 --> 01:09:26,319

mr lahood uh gentlemen what seems

1842

01:09:30,149 --> 01:09:28,239

incredibly difficult for you is that

1843

01:09:33,430 --> 01:09:30,159

there's two almost competing but

1844

01:09:35,510 --> 01:09:33,440

different uh narratives one is

1845

01:09:36,789 --> 01:09:35,520

it's

1846

01:09:38,470 --> 01:09:36,799

no one knows whether there's

1847

01:09:40,870 --> 01:09:38,480

extraterrestrial life it's a big

1848

01:09:42,630 --> 01:09:40,880

universe and it would be

1849

01:09:45,590 --> 01:09:42,640

uh pretty presumptuous to have a hard

1850

01:09:47,990 --> 01:09:45,600

and fast conclusion and then if there is

1851

01:09:49,990 --> 01:09:48,000

it's not beyond the realm of possibility

1852

01:09:50,950 --> 01:09:50,000

that there is some exploration coming

1853

01:09:52,789 --> 01:09:50,960

here

1854

01:09:54,870 --> 01:09:52,799

uh and that underlies a lot of the

1855

01:09:56,390 --> 01:09:54,880

reports you get i think mr lahood was

1856

01:09:58,790 --> 01:09:56,400

asking about that people think there

1857

01:10:00,229 --> 01:09:58,800

must be extraterrestrial life and it's

1858

01:10:02,390 --> 01:10:00,239

not at all

1859

01:10:04,950 --> 01:10:02,400

beyond the pale that uh there would be a

1860

01:10:06,790 --> 01:10:04,960

visit here on the other hand you as a

1861

01:10:09,910 --> 01:10:06,800

did you have the responsibility to make

1862

01:10:12,070 --> 01:10:09,920

sure uh that our national security is

1863

01:10:14,070 --> 01:10:12,080

protected and that if there are

1864

01:10:16,390 --> 01:10:14,080

surveillance drones or

1865

01:10:19,510 --> 01:10:16,400

uh active drones that can disable our

1866

01:10:20,709 --> 01:10:19,520

systems uh that has to be analyzed has

1867

01:10:23,350 --> 01:10:20,719

to be stopped

1868

01:10:24,870 --> 01:10:23,360

so how do you divide the

1869

01:10:27,750 --> 01:10:24,880

these how do you separate your

1870

01:10:28,550 --> 01:10:27,760

responsibilities where uh you get all

1871

01:10:31,590 --> 01:10:28,560

these

1872

01:10:34,070 --> 01:10:31,600

reports from folks who

1873

01:10:36,390 --> 01:10:34,080

may be in good faith maybe not

1874

01:10:39,910 --> 01:10:36,400

believe that you should be investigating

1875

01:10:43,030 --> 01:10:41,430

report of a

1876

01:10:45,350 --> 01:10:43,040

extraterrestrial

1877

01:10:47,669 --> 01:10:45,360

incident i'll start with you mr moultrie

1878

01:10:50,709 --> 01:10:47,679

sure indeed congressman and thank you

1879

01:10:51,210 --> 01:10:50,719

for the question um it's important that

1880

01:10:52,390 --> 01:10:51,220

we

1881

01:10:54,950 --> 01:10:52,400

[Music]

1882

01:10:56,470 --> 01:10:54,960

as a part of this effort

1883

01:10:57,910 --> 01:10:56,480

really

1884

01:10:59,990 --> 01:10:57,920

build out the relationship that we have

1885

01:11:01,990 --> 01:11:00,000

with others including nasa and for the

1886

01:11:04,070 --> 01:11:02,000

reasons that you just pointed out

1887

01:11:05,270 --> 01:11:04,080

so there are elements in our government

1888

01:11:06,950 --> 01:11:05,280

that are

1889

01:11:09,910 --> 01:11:06,960

engaged in

1890

01:11:11,110 --> 01:11:09,920

uh looking for life in other places and

1891

01:11:12,390 --> 01:11:11,120

they have been doing that for decades

1892

01:11:14,310 --> 01:11:12,400

right they've been searching for

1893

01:11:16,149 --> 01:11:14,320

extraterrestrial life

1894

01:11:18,070 --> 01:11:16,159

there are astro biologists who have been

1895

01:11:22,470 --> 01:11:18,080

doing this too we're a part of that same

1896

01:11:24,229 --> 01:11:22,480

government and so our goal is not to

1897

01:11:25,590 --> 01:11:24,239

potentially cover up something if we

1898

01:11:26,470 --> 01:11:25,600

were to find something it's to

1899

01:11:29,430 --> 01:11:26,480

understand

1900

01:11:33,350 --> 01:11:29,440

what may be out there uh

1901

01:11:34,790 --> 01:11:33,360

examine what um what it may mean for us

1902

01:11:36,709 --> 01:11:34,800

if there are any from a defense

1903

01:11:38,950 --> 01:11:36,719

perspective any national security

1904

01:11:41,110 --> 01:11:38,960

implications or ramifications but then

1905

01:11:42,229 --> 01:11:41,120

to work with organizations as

1906

01:11:45,430 --> 01:11:42,239

appropriate if it's a weather

1907

01:11:47,669 --> 01:11:45,440

phenomenology with noaa if it's uh an uh

1908

01:11:49,510 --> 01:11:47,679

potential for extraterrestrial life or

1909

01:11:51,270 --> 01:11:49,520

an indication of extraordinary life with

1910

01:11:53,030 --> 01:11:51,280

someone like nasa

1911

01:11:55,430 --> 01:11:53,040

the transparency actually is very

1912

01:11:57,510 --> 01:11:55,440

important completely for public uh

1913

01:11:58,870 --> 01:11:57,520

consumption completely but we're going

1914

01:12:01,750 --> 01:11:58,880

to have a classified briefing and

1915

01:12:03,750 --> 01:12:01,760

without going into the details uh of

1916

01:12:07,270 --> 01:12:03,760

what kinds of secrets

1917

01:12:09,430 --> 01:12:07,280

that we can't share here

1918

01:12:10,870 --> 01:12:09,440

what is it what are we

1919

01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:10,880

protecting i don't know if you can

1920

01:12:13,510 --> 01:12:12,480

answer this question

1921

01:12:15,430 --> 01:12:13,520

uh

1922

01:12:17,750 --> 01:12:15,440

in this open forum

1923

01:12:19,510 --> 01:12:17,760

but in fact uh

1924

01:12:21,430 --> 01:12:19,520

your perception of what it is we have to

1925

01:12:23,590 --> 01:12:21,440

quote so i think right now what's really

1926

01:12:25,590 --> 01:12:23,600

important for us to protect is

1927

01:12:26,950 --> 01:12:25,600

how we know certain things so there are

1928

01:12:30,070 --> 01:12:26,960

a lot of things that we know whether it

1929

01:12:33,990 --> 01:12:32,470

the thinking of other leaders around the

1930

01:12:35,910 --> 01:12:34,000

world the weapon systems that are being

1931

01:12:37,750 --> 01:12:35,920

developed or how we detect things that

1932

01:12:39,510 --> 01:12:37,760

may be threats to us

1933

01:12:41,189 --> 01:12:39,520

many of those things are

1934

01:12:42,870 --> 01:12:41,199

the result of some of our most sensitive

1935

01:12:44,870 --> 01:12:42,880

sources and methods and we'll use those

1936

01:12:47,270 --> 01:12:44,880

things not just for this effort but

1937

01:12:50,149 --> 01:12:47,280

those same sources and methods are used

1938

01:12:51,990 --> 01:12:50,159

to help protect us from adversaries and

1939

01:12:53,750 --> 01:12:52,000

from others who might mean to do us harm

1940

01:12:56,790 --> 01:12:53,760

there aren't separate

1941

01:12:59,030 --> 01:12:56,800

uap sensors there's not a separate uap

1942

01:13:01,510 --> 01:12:59,040

processing computer it is not a separate

1943

01:13:03,350 --> 01:13:01,520

uap dissemination chain or whatever so

1944

01:13:05,110 --> 01:13:03,360

it's the same process it's the same

1945

01:13:08,149 --> 01:13:05,120

system that we have that helps us do all

1946

01:13:10,229 --> 01:13:08,159

that we need to protect that because

1947

01:13:11,750 --> 01:13:10,239

this is something that that we're

1948

01:13:12,870 --> 01:13:11,760

looking at but we're sure there's going

1949

01:13:14,550 --> 01:13:12,880

to be other things that we'll look at in

1950

01:13:16,310 --> 01:13:14,560

the future that will need those same

1951

01:13:17,910 --> 01:13:16,320

sensors we'll need those same sources

1952

01:13:19,910 --> 01:13:17,920

and methods to help us do so we're

1953

01:13:21,750 --> 01:13:19,920

protecting the fact of the that this

1954

01:13:24,709 --> 01:13:21,760

nation has developed capabilities that

1955

01:13:26,709 --> 01:13:24,719

enable us to know what may be

1956

01:13:29,510 --> 01:13:26,719

threats to us and to counter those

1957

01:13:31,830 --> 01:13:29,520

threats before they uh become something

1958

01:13:33,830 --> 01:13:31,840

of a a national issue thank you very

1959

01:13:35,910 --> 01:13:33,840

much i want to thank both you mr brand

1960

01:13:38,229 --> 01:13:35,920

you mr moultrie for your parents today i

1961

01:13:40,550 --> 01:13:38,239

yield back

1962

01:13:42,709 --> 01:13:40,560

gentleman yields back

1963

01:13:45,910 --> 01:13:42,719

gentlemen beyond videos

1964

01:13:47,910 --> 01:13:45,920

is there a range of other information

1965

01:13:50,229 --> 01:13:47,920

that the executive branch has that would

1966

01:13:51,990 --> 01:13:50,239

be valuable to the american people

1967

01:13:53,510 --> 01:13:52,000

while protecting sources and methods

1968

01:13:55,990 --> 01:13:53,520

obviously

1969

01:13:57,990 --> 01:13:56,000

the details of individual encounters

1970

01:14:01,270 --> 01:13:58,000

including the time place and details of

1971

01:14:04,149 --> 01:14:01,280

an encounter and does the aim song have

1972

01:14:05,270 --> 01:14:04,159

a clear and repeatable process

1973

01:14:08,070 --> 01:14:05,280

um

1974

01:14:10,229 --> 01:14:08,080

for considering public release

1975

01:14:12,070 --> 01:14:10,239

as part of the process

1976

01:14:13,510 --> 01:14:12,080

jaren carson the um do you commit to

1977

01:14:16,310 --> 01:14:13,520

building that process if it's not in

1978

01:14:18,390 --> 01:14:16,320

place uh the uap task force uh you know

1979

01:14:20,390 --> 01:14:18,400

the the security classification guide uh

1980

01:14:22,950 --> 01:14:20,400

that the uap task force has been

1981

01:14:24,310 --> 01:14:22,960

operating under that i approved

1982

01:14:27,110 --> 01:14:24,320

really was meant to protect those

1983

01:14:29,510 --> 01:14:27,120

sources and methods and meant to protect

1984

01:14:30,790 --> 01:14:29,520

any knowledge uh that an adversary

1985

01:14:32,229 --> 01:14:30,800

intelligence

1986

01:14:34,229 --> 01:14:32,239

entity may gain

1987

01:14:37,189 --> 01:14:34,239

from unders from understanding what

1988

01:14:39,830 --> 01:14:37,199

we're tracking how we track it or

1989

01:14:42,149 --> 01:14:39,840

when we're tracking it or if we're not

1990

01:14:44,149 --> 01:14:42,159

um and so that has been an important

1991

01:14:46,950 --> 01:14:44,159

piece uh in the balance between

1992

01:14:49,270 --> 01:14:46,960

transparency uh and preserving our

1993

01:14:51,990 --> 01:14:49,280

warfighting advantage because the u.s

1994

01:14:53,669 --> 01:14:52,000

military does train as it would fight

1995

01:14:56,310 --> 01:14:53,679

um what i

1996

01:14:59,030 --> 01:14:56,320

will commit to uh is at least for that

1997

01:15:00,149 --> 01:14:59,040

material it's under my authority

1998

01:15:02,070 --> 01:15:00,159

as the deputy director of naval

1999

01:15:04,070 --> 01:15:02,080

intelligence

2000

01:15:08,630 --> 01:15:04,080

for

2001

01:15:10,790 --> 01:15:08,640
not involve sources of methods

2002

01:15:12,870 --> 01:15:10,800
or and when we can

2003

01:15:14,550 --> 01:15:12,880
with a reasonable uh degree of

2004

01:15:16,550 --> 01:15:14,560
confidence determine that it does not

2005

01:15:18,709 --> 01:15:16,560
pose a foreign intelligence or national

2006

01:15:19,990 --> 01:15:18,719
security threat uh and it's within my

2007

01:15:22,470 --> 01:15:20,000
authority to do so i commit to

2008

01:15:24,630 --> 01:15:22,480
declassifying that so i i believe very

2009

01:15:26,870 --> 01:15:24,640
much in the transparency of this

2010

01:15:28,470 --> 01:15:26,880
and we work very hard to balance that

2011

01:15:30,550 --> 01:15:28,480
with our national security needs and

2012

01:15:33,110 --> 01:15:30,560
i'll just add congressman

2013

01:15:35,189 --> 01:15:33,120

just over the last three four months i

2014

01:15:37,590 --> 01:15:35,199

think that the

2015

01:15:39,270 --> 01:15:37,600

the intelligence community and the

2016

01:15:41,270 --> 01:15:39,280

national defense apparatus have

2017

01:15:43,510 --> 01:15:41,280

disclosed more information on various

2018

01:15:46,950 --> 01:15:43,520

events than it has and

2019

01:15:48,550 --> 01:15:46,960

probably see the the previous 10 years

2020

01:15:49,669 --> 01:15:48,560

you have our commitment to work closely

2021

01:15:51,430 --> 01:15:49,679

with the director of national

2022

01:15:52,990 --> 01:15:51,440

intelligence and

2023

01:15:55,030 --> 01:15:53,000

others in the

2024

01:15:56,229 --> 01:15:55,040

declassification and downgrading of

2025

01:15:57,669 --> 01:15:56,239

intel

2026

01:15:59,350 --> 01:15:57,679

apparatus to ensure that we can get

2027

01:16:01,350 --> 01:15:59,360

whatever information that we can out to

2028

01:16:02,950 --> 01:16:01,360

the american people and to the public at

2029

01:16:04,870 --> 01:16:02,960

large

2030

01:16:07,270 --> 01:16:04,880

greatly appreciate it sir ranking member

2031

01:16:09,910 --> 01:16:07,280

crawford thank you mr chairman um

2032

01:16:11,270 --> 01:16:09,920

representative stefanik is in route i

2033

01:16:13,189 --> 01:16:11,280

believe just real quickly but in the

2034

01:16:15,510 --> 01:16:13,199

interim if i could if you'll indulge me

2035

01:16:17,910 --> 01:16:15,520

i just have one a couple of real small

2036

01:16:20,070 --> 01:16:17,920

questions one is uh

2037

01:16:22,709 --> 01:16:20,080

do we have an example can you cite us a

2038

01:16:25,270 --> 01:16:22,719

specific example of an object that can't

2039

01:16:29,510 --> 01:16:25,280

be explained as having been human-made

2040

01:16:31,990 --> 01:16:30,760

i mean the the um

2041

01:16:33,910 --> 01:16:32,000

[Music]

2042

01:16:35,270 --> 01:16:33,920

the example that

2043

01:16:37,430 --> 01:16:35,280

that i would say that we that is still

2044

01:16:39,910 --> 01:16:37,440

unresolved uh that i think everyone

2045

01:16:43,510 --> 01:16:39,920

understands quite well is the 2004 uh

2046

01:16:45,910 --> 01:16:43,520

incident from from nimitz uh we have

2047

01:16:48,470 --> 01:16:45,920

data on that and that simply remains

2048

01:16:50,870 --> 01:16:48,480

unresolved uh does not mean it resolves

2049

01:16:52,229 --> 01:16:50,880

to being something right that is easily

2050

01:16:53,830 --> 01:16:52,239

explainable or

2051

01:16:55,350 --> 01:16:53,840

difficulty or well obviously it resolves

2052

01:16:56,390 --> 01:16:55,360

to being something that is difficult to

2053

01:16:58,550 --> 01:16:56,400

explain

2054

01:17:00,709 --> 01:16:58,560

but i i can't point to something that

2055

01:17:02,070 --> 01:17:00,719

definitively was not

2056

01:17:04,149 --> 01:17:02,080

manmade but i can point to a number of

2057

01:17:06,550 --> 01:17:04,159

examples and which remain unresolved

2058

01:17:08,470 --> 01:17:06,560

gotcha uh with regard to videos that

2059

01:17:10,390 --> 01:17:08,480

have appeared in open source channels

2060

01:17:12,470 --> 01:17:10,400

for example the tic tac video

2061

01:17:14,149 --> 01:17:12,480

does aimsog maintain control of videos

2062

01:17:16,229 --> 01:17:14,159

and how do you prevent

2063

01:17:18,630 --> 01:17:16,239

leaks of potentially classified videos

2064

01:17:21,350 --> 01:17:18,640

or other material

2065

01:17:24,070 --> 01:17:21,360

so the aims log as we establish that

2066

01:17:26,390 --> 01:17:24,080

organization we will have a

2067

01:17:28,229 --> 01:17:26,400

a process for classified and

2068

01:17:29,990 --> 01:17:28,239

compartmented holdings and we will find

2069

01:17:31,990 --> 01:17:30,000

a way of getting positive control over

2070

01:17:33,590 --> 01:17:32,000

those we have

2071

01:17:35,350 --> 01:17:33,600

our sensitive access programs and

2072

01:17:37,110 --> 01:17:35,360

special access programs that allow us to

2073

01:17:39,110 --> 01:17:37,120

put what we call saps around things and

2074

01:17:41,270 --> 01:17:39,120

then there's controlled access programs

2075

01:17:42,709 --> 01:17:41,280

that allow us put caps around things so

2076

01:17:46,070 --> 01:17:42,719

we'll have that

2077

01:17:47,669 --> 01:17:46,080

in place our goal will be

2078

01:17:49,030 --> 01:17:47,679

ensuring that we're sharing that with

2079

01:17:51,270 --> 01:17:49,040

the appropriate analysts and the

2080

01:17:52,709 --> 01:17:51,280

appropriate exploiters if you will who

2081

01:17:55,030 --> 01:17:52,719

can look at that data too what we don't

2082

01:17:57,510 --> 01:17:55,040

want to do is bring something into a dod

2083

01:17:58,790 --> 01:17:57,520

database or a dod holding and then have

2084

01:18:01,030 --> 01:17:58,800

so many rappers around it's not

2085

01:18:02,790 --> 01:18:01,040

available to those who really need to

2086

01:18:04,390 --> 01:18:02,800

look at it and to exploit it and that's

2087

01:18:06,229 --> 01:18:04,400

one of the reasons we're establishing

2088

01:18:07,830 --> 01:18:06,239

relationships with the interagency with

2089

01:18:10,229 --> 01:18:07,840

the ic and others to be able to do that

2090

01:18:11,990 --> 01:18:10,239

sir but we will do our best to maintain

2091

01:18:13,669 --> 01:18:12,000

positive control over the materials that

2092

01:18:15,590 --> 01:18:13,679

we have within our holdings

2093

01:18:17,830 --> 01:18:15,600

thank you

2094

01:18:19,510 --> 01:18:17,840

chairmanship

2095

01:18:22,630 --> 01:18:19,520

thank you mr chairman just going back to

2096

01:18:24,550 --> 01:18:22,640

the 2021 report um

2097

01:18:26,630 --> 01:18:24,560

you know under the category of

2098

01:18:28,950 --> 01:18:26,640

uap appear to demonstrate advanced

2099

01:18:31,270 --> 01:18:28,960

technology those 18

2100

01:18:32,550 --> 01:18:31,280

incidents

2101

01:18:33,910 --> 01:18:32,560

in which

2102

01:18:35,750 --> 01:18:33,920

some of the uap

2103

01:18:37,669 --> 01:18:35,760

appear to remain stationary winds aloft

2104

01:18:39,830 --> 01:18:37,679

move against the wind maneuver abruptly

2105

01:18:42,070 --> 01:18:39,840

or move at considerable speed without

2106

01:18:43,669 --> 01:18:42,080

discernible means of propulsion

2107

01:18:46,149 --> 01:18:43,679

it goes on to say in a small number of

2108

01:18:48,790 --> 01:18:46,159

cases military aircraft systems

2109

01:18:52,470 --> 01:18:48,800

processed radio frequency energy

2110

01:18:53,910 --> 01:18:52,480

associated with uap sightings

2111

01:18:55,910 --> 01:18:53,920

i couldn't tell from that whether that

2112

01:18:59,830 --> 01:18:55,920

small number of cases

2113

01:19:02,950 --> 01:18:59,840

was a part of the subset of 18 that is

2114

01:19:04,630 --> 01:19:02,960

uh among the 18 which appeared to move

2115

01:19:05,990 --> 01:19:04,640

uh with unusual pattern or flight

2116

01:19:08,229 --> 01:19:06,000

characteristics

2117

01:19:14,070 --> 01:19:08,239

to some of those

2118

01:19:17,510 --> 01:19:16,229

i would have to check with our uap task

2119

01:19:19,110 --> 01:19:17,520

force on that i

2120

01:19:21,030 --> 01:19:19,120

uh

2121

01:19:22,390 --> 01:19:21,040

i believe without getting into specifics

2122

01:19:25,189 --> 01:19:22,400

that we can do in the in the closed

2123

01:19:28,470 --> 01:19:25,199

session uh at least some that we have

2124

01:19:32,870 --> 01:19:28,480

detected uh rf uh emissions from we're

2125

01:19:34,830 --> 01:19:32,880

not uh uh behaving uh oddly otherwise

2126

01:19:38,390 --> 01:19:34,840

uh and and the significance

2127

01:19:39,750 --> 01:19:38,400

of uh measuring that radio frequency

2128

01:19:42,310 --> 01:19:39,760

energy

2129

01:19:44,550 --> 01:19:42,320

is what that uh we suspect that this was

2130

01:19:46,950 --> 01:19:44,560

a some form of aircraft in which there

2131

01:19:48,310 --> 01:19:46,960

were radio transmissions

2132

01:19:50,229 --> 01:19:48,320

the biggest thing that you're looking

2133

01:19:51,910 --> 01:19:50,239

for there is any indication of of an

2134

01:19:53,350 --> 01:19:51,920

effort to jam

2135

01:19:55,910 --> 01:19:53,360

whatever sensors that we may have

2136

01:19:57,430 --> 01:19:55,920

looking at it but i would also also add

2137

01:19:59,510 --> 01:19:57,440

to that that

2138

01:20:02,390 --> 01:19:59,520

radio frequency as you know congressman

2139

01:20:05,830 --> 01:20:02,400

is used to control uh various platforms

2140

01:20:09,030 --> 01:20:05,840

too so the fact of uh emanations coming

2141

01:20:11,030 --> 01:20:09,040

off of any platform whether it be a uav

2142

01:20:12,310 --> 01:20:11,040

or another platform

2143

01:20:16,310 --> 01:20:12,320

could be

2144

01:20:17,430 --> 01:20:16,320

radio frequency activity related to that

2145

01:20:19,350 --> 01:20:17,440

entity

2146

01:20:21,510 --> 01:20:19,360

transmitting out or

2147

01:20:23,510 --> 01:20:21,520

something transmitting to that platform

2148

01:20:25,189 --> 01:20:23,520

and of course we have a sensitivity with

2149

01:20:26,870 --> 01:20:25,199

our airborne platforms and picking it up

2150

01:20:28,310 --> 01:20:26,880

which is one of the reasons that we try

2151
01:20:30,070 --> 01:20:28,320
to prevent people from using their cell

2152
01:20:32,470 --> 01:20:30,080
phones on airplanes and things like that

2153
01:20:34,390 --> 01:20:32,480
it's very sensitive to rf and emanation

2154
01:20:36,149 --> 01:20:34,400
so that's a part of what we'll be

2155
01:20:38,229 --> 01:20:36,159
looking at in the ames log what is this

2156
01:20:40,149 --> 01:20:38,239
is this something that we can collect on

2157
01:20:41,990 --> 01:20:40,159
and can we start to characterize the

2158
01:20:43,430 --> 01:20:42,000
signaling environment around the

2159
01:20:45,350 --> 01:20:43,440
emanations that may be coming off of

2160
01:20:48,390 --> 01:20:45,360
some of these uaps

2161
01:20:51,030 --> 01:20:48,400
so that that energy then um that was

2162
01:20:52,550 --> 01:20:51,040
recorded could be either

2163
01:20:54,950 --> 01:20:52,560

an effort to jam or it could be an

2164

01:20:57,430 --> 01:20:54,960

effort to control a uav

2165

01:20:58,149 --> 01:20:57,440

um

2166

01:21:00,790 --> 01:20:58,159

or

2167

01:21:03,030 --> 01:21:00,800

any other communication with that uh

2168

01:21:05,510 --> 01:21:03,040

craft i would say that's accurate

2169

01:21:07,430 --> 01:21:05,520

right thank you mr chairman

2170

01:21:11,350 --> 01:21:07,440

thank you chairman

2171

01:21:14,790 --> 01:21:11,360

um at as the odni report makes clear one

2172

01:21:17,590 --> 01:21:14,800

possible explanation for uaps is that we

2173

01:21:21,510 --> 01:21:17,600

are detecting u.s aircraft either secret

2174

01:21:23,030 --> 01:21:21,520

air programs or even test prototypes

2175

01:21:25,590 --> 01:21:23,040

i won't ask you in this setting

2176
01:21:28,550 --> 01:21:25,600
obviously to describe any secret dod

2177
01:21:30,550 --> 01:21:28,560
programs that said i do want to make

2178
01:21:32,950 --> 01:21:30,560
sure the u.s government isn't chasing

2179
01:21:34,790 --> 01:21:32,960
its own tail

2180
01:21:36,950 --> 01:21:34,800
firstly do you have a clear and

2181
01:21:39,189 --> 01:21:36,960
repeatable process to check with

2182
01:21:42,070 --> 01:21:39,199
compartment programs about whether a uap

2183
01:21:43,270 --> 01:21:42,080
sighting is attributable to a u.s

2184
01:21:44,870 --> 01:21:43,280
aircraft

2185
01:21:46,229 --> 01:21:44,880
uh secondly do

2186
01:21:48,629 --> 01:21:46,239
does the aimsaw

2187
01:21:50,149 --> 01:21:48,639
staff have the clearances

2188
01:21:52,070 --> 01:21:50,159

and read-ons

2189

01:21:54,709 --> 01:21:52,080

that they need to investigate all of

2190

01:21:58,709 --> 01:21:54,719

these incidents and and thirdly

2191

01:22:00,950 --> 01:21:58,719

when your staff cannot be read on

2192

01:22:03,030 --> 01:22:00,960

are your questions to those who are read

2193

01:22:05,350 --> 01:22:03,040

on even being answered

2194

01:22:08,070 --> 01:22:05,360

so i'll start and then uh i'll pass that

2195

01:22:11,189 --> 01:22:08,080

to uh to mr bray so we're very conscious

2196

01:22:13,350 --> 01:22:11,199

of the potential blue on blue issue or

2197

01:22:15,030 --> 01:22:13,360

us on u.s and so

2198

01:22:17,510 --> 01:22:15,040

we've established relationships with

2199

01:22:19,110 --> 01:22:17,520

organizations and entities that

2200

01:22:20,390 --> 01:22:19,120

that are

2201

01:22:22,790 --> 01:22:20,400

potentially

2202

01:22:25,590 --> 01:22:22,800

flying or developing platforms for their

2203

01:22:27,270 --> 01:22:25,600

own interests if you will and our goal

2204

01:22:29,110 --> 01:22:27,280

is to continue and we have a repeatable

2205

01:22:30,390 --> 01:22:29,120

process i think we've had that process

2206

01:22:33,750 --> 01:22:30,400

for some time

2207

01:22:35,430 --> 01:22:33,760

to deconflict uh activities that we may

2208

01:22:37,270 --> 01:22:35,440

have to ensure that we are not

2209

01:22:38,390 --> 01:22:37,280

potentially reporting on something that

2210

01:22:41,350 --> 01:22:38,400

may be

2211

01:22:44,390 --> 01:22:41,360

a developmental platform or a u.s

2212

01:22:46,229 --> 01:22:44,400

operational platform that is performing

2213

01:22:48,070 --> 01:22:46,239

either testing or performing a mission

2214

01:22:49,590 --> 01:22:48,080

so we will have that

2215

01:22:51,590 --> 01:22:49,600

in place we've already had those

2216

01:22:54,470 --> 01:22:51,600

discussions with organizations and

2217

01:22:56,950 --> 01:22:54,480

entities we want to uh ensure that we're

2218

01:22:58,149 --> 01:22:56,960

protecting their equities we want to

2219

01:23:00,310 --> 01:22:58,159

ensure that we're protecting their

2220

01:23:01,910 --> 01:23:00,320

sources and methods while also getting

2221

01:23:03,910 --> 01:23:01,920

at what we have here we want to be able

2222

01:23:06,070 --> 01:23:03,920

to deconflict those

2223

01:23:08,870 --> 01:23:06,080

absolutely the uap task force has uh uh

2224

01:23:09,830 --> 01:23:08,880

had a a process in place to work uh with

2225

01:23:10,870 --> 01:23:09,840

other elements of the department of

2226

01:23:13,350 --> 01:23:10,880

defense and other elements of the

2227

01:23:16,070 --> 01:23:13,360

government to ensure that uh that there

2228

01:23:18,229 --> 01:23:16,080

is an uh as simple a way as possible to

2229

01:23:20,709 --> 01:23:18,239

deconflict those and when we reference

2230

01:23:22,310 --> 01:23:20,719

that in the in the report uh i should

2231

01:23:23,750 --> 01:23:22,320

say that we were

2232

01:23:25,189 --> 01:23:23,760

simply accounting for the fact that

2233

01:23:28,070 --> 01:23:25,199

there could

2234

01:23:29,750 --> 01:23:28,080

possibly be one or two uh data points

2235

01:23:31,270 --> 01:23:29,760

that had that it leaked through but we

2236

01:23:34,310 --> 01:23:31,280

were quite confident that was not the

2237

01:23:38,950 --> 01:23:37,510

um how how are you all liaisoning with

2238

01:23:40,870 --> 01:23:38,960

um

2239

01:23:43,910 --> 01:23:40,880

space command

2240

01:23:45,110 --> 01:23:43,920

specifically how are you partnering with

2241

01:23:46,709 --> 01:23:45,120

the parts

2242

01:23:48,709 --> 01:23:46,719

of the u.s based

2243

01:23:49,830 --> 01:23:48,719

command responsible for space domain

2244

01:23:51,910 --> 01:23:49,840

awareness

2245

01:23:54,149 --> 01:23:51,920

and how if at all are you

2246

01:23:57,510 --> 01:23:54,159

partnering with the space force to

2247

01:24:00,950 --> 01:23:59,640

the uap task force has

2248

01:24:02,950 --> 01:24:00,960

[Music]

2249

01:24:04,229 --> 01:24:02,960

has a very good uh relationship uh with

2250

01:24:06,790 --> 01:24:04,239

space force as it does with the rest of

2251

01:24:08,790 --> 01:24:06,800

the department of defense uh we have uh

2252

01:24:11,270 --> 01:24:08,800

pulled analysts in from space force to

2253

01:24:13,590 --> 01:24:11,280

ensure that uh uh that we're availing

2254

01:24:17,110 --> 01:24:13,600

ourselves of that expertise uh as well

2255

01:24:18,709 --> 01:24:17,120

as um uh any um any other material they

2256

01:24:21,430 --> 01:24:18,719

may have that would be helpful

2257

01:24:23,669 --> 01:24:21,440

and the congressman as you know

2258

01:24:25,350 --> 01:24:23,679

space force and space command they have

2259

01:24:27,030 --> 01:24:25,360

responsibility for space domain

2260

01:24:29,350 --> 01:24:27,040

awareness so what we've done we

2261

01:24:32,629 --> 01:24:29,360

coordinated with with space force we

2262

01:24:34,550 --> 01:24:32,639

coordinated with their j2 and uh she is

2263

01:24:35,590 --> 01:24:34,560

on board in terms of helping us plug

2264

01:24:37,910 --> 01:24:35,600

into

2265

01:24:39,910 --> 01:24:37,920

what they have and for us to have this

2266

01:24:41,430 --> 01:24:39,920

interactive exchange of information and

2267

01:24:43,110 --> 01:24:41,440

data and we're doing that with all the

2268

01:24:45,030 --> 01:24:43,120

services not just with space force or

2269

01:24:46,790 --> 01:24:45,040

spacecraft

2270

01:24:48,149 --> 01:24:46,800

thank you sir ranking member any

2271

01:24:50,470 --> 01:24:48,159

additional questions all right

2272

01:24:52,229 --> 01:24:50,480

chairmanship

2273

01:24:53,990 --> 01:24:52,239

all right uh with that i want to thank

2274

01:24:55,910 --> 01:24:54,000

you all for for taking the time out i

2275

01:24:57,590 --> 01:24:55,920

also want to thank my colleagues on both

2276

01:25:00,070 --> 01:24:57,600

sides of the aisle for

2277

01:25:02,709 --> 01:25:00,080

participating in this very

2278

01:25:04,870 --> 01:25:02,719

historical and important

2279

01:25:06,790 --> 01:25:04,880

hearing i think it's one of the few

2280

01:25:09,990 --> 01:25:06,800

times we can demonstrate some degree of

2281

01:25:12,070 --> 01:25:10,000

bipartisanship around uaps and ufos so i

2282

01:25:14,070 --> 01:25:12,080

love it i appreciate it thank you and we

2283

01:25:15,830 --> 01:25:14,080

will see you all we will recess this